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Decisiveness:
Its Nature and Its Relationship to Psychological Adjustment (May, 1974)
Michael S. Welssman, B.A. , Princeton University
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Norman Slmonson
Decision-making ability In well defined situations has been the
subject of much study In recent years, but little attention has been
paid to decisiveness as a general characteristic of Individuals which
may relate to other areas of psychological ftinctlonlng. The present
Investigation attempts to examine the nature of decisiveness and its
relationship to a number of areas of psychological adjustment.
Six dimensions of decisiveness are defined, each tapping a parti-
cular aspect of the decision-making process. These include four
behavioral dimensions which are based on performance in various deftiiion-
making sitxiations (need for information, confidence in decisions, risk
taking, and tendency to defer decisions), and two global, impressionistic
dimensions, a self-appraisal of decisiveness and a peer rating of de-
cisiveness. Instruments tapping each of these dimensions were ad-
ministered to a large number of undergraduates, along with a variety of
subjective and objective measures of psychological adjustment. It was
postulated that subjects who score high on the decisiveness measures
will also score high on the adjustment measures, thus indicating a
relationship between decisiveness and adjustment.
Besults supported the test validity of all of the measures
except
for Tendency to Defer Decisions, which showed evidence of
multidlmensionality.
VThe pattern of relationships between the decisiveness measures suggested
that decisiveness itself is not a single, global characteristic of
individuals, but rather contains a number of relatively independent
aspects which do show some relationship to each other. The biggest
distinction is between the behavioral and the impressionistic dimen-
sions of decisiveness.
The pattern of relationships between the decisiveness and adjust-
ment measures indicated that the impressionistic measures of decisive-
ness related more strongly to adjustment than did the behavioral measures
of decisiveness. While these data were shown to be contaminated by
methods factors, the observed correlation between the self and peer
ratings, coupled with the fact that these two measures of decisiveness
related to the adjustment measures in very similar ways, suggest that
the entire relationship between the self-appraisals of decisiveness
and adjustment is not a function of response bias. In addition to this
major finding, it was observed that the behavioral measures of decisive-
ness tend to relate to behavioral indicators of adjustment, and that
sex is a factor in the interaction between decisiveness and adjustment,
with decisive females reporting higher self ratings of adjustment, and
decisive males receiving higher peer ratings of adjustment. Other,
more specific conclusions are presented, and all conclusions are dis-
cussed from the perspective of a theoretical and experiential link
between decisiveness and adjustment.
While this research clearly supports the existence of a relation-
ship between decisiveness and psychological adjustment, further
research
employing a more refined methodology, a more heterogeneous subject
population, and decision-making situations which more closely approxi-
mate real-life situations Is indicated.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Man becomes truly human only at the moment of decision."
Paul Tillich
The ability to make decisions is a vital characteristic of being
human which has been emphasized by philosophers and religious leaders
for centuries. Most recently, the so-called "existentialists,"
coming from both religious and secular traditions, have noted the
crucial importance of man's capacity to choose his own values, roles,
and meaning in life, as evidenced in a theme repeated throughout the
work of Sartre, "I am my choices." William James, in the early days
of modem psychology, stated that "there is no more miserable human
being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision" (1893)
,
and contemporary observers of modem man such as Toffler (1970) have
pointed out the adverse consequences of a society which places an
ever increasing demand on the individual to make more decisions than
he can handle. Indeed, it is in the experience of making decisions
that the individual most fully experiences his own capabilities and
potential for growth, and the ability to make decisions is one of the
most important factors in the way one reacts to and copes with stress.
It is the intention of this research to examine the link between one's
ability to make decisions and his ability to cope with stress and
satisfactorily meet the demands of life in modem society.
It is important to specify at the outset of this research the
major theme which distinguishes it from previous work on decision-making.
2A considerable body of literature exists on decision-making, but by
far the major portion of this literature Is devoted to either under-
standing the various factors which affect the decision-making process,
or to developing models, usually mathematical, which shed light on the
decision-making process. Thus, one sees many comprehensive studies
on the effect of such variables as personality traits, skill versus
chance conditions, amount of payoff, values, or prior training on
decision-making. Similarly, there are complicated mathematical analogues
of the decision-making process which explore optimal decision-making
strategies, expected gains set against objective costs, and input-
output equations. Now, all of these studies are important and useful,
and in fact many of them will be cited later in our attempt to develop
an effective methodology for the present research. Our major interest,
however, lies not in specifying elements of the decision-making process
or even the extent to which the ability to engage in the process is
affected by personality or other variables. Rather, we are interested
in exploring the consequences which follow from the existence of certain
patterns or styles of decision-making in an individual. Most generally,
we are posing the following question: "Is there a relationship between
an individual's ability to engage in the decision-making process and
his ability to cope with life and its stresses?" More specifically,
does the person who requires a great amount of information prior to
reaching a decision experience greater anxiety under stress than an
individual who is able to make a decision without a great deal of
Information? Is the individual who experiences difficulty in making
a decision more likely to fall in social or academic tasks? This
is
3the type of question this research will attempt to answer.
Of course, this is not to say that factors which are responsible
for the development of decision-making styles are not important. The
theoretical persepctives which form the basis of this research strongly
emphasize the determinants of decision-making behavior, and it would
be foolish to pretend that perfectly stable decision-making styles
arise out of a vacuum. Indded, it can be argued that the "arbitrary"
consideration of the decision-making styles of the individual apart
from his personal history, situational variables, and personality factors
which affect decision-making would result in a simplistic or even in-
valid study. On the other hand, the same argument can be used against
considering any human phenomenon as a distinct object of inquiry. For
example, the personality factors which are taken to be responsible for
decision-making behavior are themselves a result of many variables.
Another important point is that the utility of considering "second order"
phenomena apart from causative data has been demonstrated in many areas.
Thus, one can make predictions about the adjustment of homosexuals in
our society without dealing explicitly with the factors behind homo-
sexuality, and the behaviorists have based their entire discipline on
the premise that observable behavior is more important than unobservable
"causes" of behavior. Thus, we are considering decision-making as a
behavior which indeed is a result of many determinants, but which in
and of itself can shed light on a variety of clinical variables, includ-
ing reactions to stress, satisfaction with life situations, etc.
Having prefaced this discussion with a delineation of the problem
under consideration and a specification of the differences between this
research and related work, it is necessary to consider briefly the
theoretical justification for our assumption that decision-making plays
an important role in psychological adjustment. Two additional points
of clarification are in order at this point, however. First, our em-
phasis throughout this research will be on the phenomenological , or
experiential aspects of decision-making, although an assessment of the
"objective" elements of the process which are generally inaccessible
to the awareness of the individual will also be made in order to broaden
our insight into the decision-making process. The reason for this
emphasis will become clear in our discussion of the theoretical back-
ground of this research. Second, as a function of this emphasis, we
will use the term "decisiveness" throughout, by which we mean the
ability of the individual to engage in the decision-making process.
We will not be concerned with the objective accuracy of decisions, the
extent to which decision-making strategies approximate optimal strategies
etc. Again, the reason for this will become clear as we proceed.
Theoretical Background
The importance of decision-making in relation to both pathological
and normal adjustment is implicit in much of the literature of social
and clinical psychology. We will be concentrating on four perspectives
which relate to decision-making, which, when taken together, constitute
a strong argument for considering decisiveness as a major aspect of
psychological adjustment.
Competence . The first of these perspectives is Robert W. White's
competence theory. According to White, the urge towards competence is
5fundamental to the development of the cognitive structure by means of
which we understand the world and ourselves. He summarizes his theory
as follows:
The thesis of this essay is that the objective
stable world is a construction based upon action.
The knowledge that we gain of the environment is
a knowledge of potentialities for action, of what
one surely can do, probably can do, may be able to
do, probably cannot do, and surely cannot do with
objects and situations that arise.... It is a system
of readiness for action, and it seems to me quite
proper to conceive of it as patterns of facilitation
and inhibition in the central nervous system. Reality
leaves its record, then, in the form of action possi-
bilities learned through action and its consequences
(White, 1963, p. 69).
This emphasis on action is based on the observation that many
behaviors seem to be motivated not only to gratify biological needs
or to avoid unpleasant states, but also to simply experience the
effects of one's actions on the world. Such an experience leads to
what White refers to as the "joy in being a cause." To the degree
that the individual is successful in his attempts to affect the
world, he develops a feeling of efficacy, and the cumulative exper-
iences of efficacy result in a sense of competence. An important
corollary of this is the observation that initiating future actions
is contingent on having experienced successful past actions. Thtis,
the individual who has developed a sense of competence through past
successful actions is more likely to take future actions, while an
individual who has not had such experiences becomes reluctant to en-
gage in actions. This point has strong implications for such clinical
variables as level of aspiration, motivation, reactions to stress, and
self-esteem. As White states it:
6Self-esteem.
. .has its taproot in the experience of
efficacy. It is not built merely on what others do
or what the environment provides. From the very
start it is based on what one can make the environ-
ment provide, even if it is only through more vig-
orous sucking or more loudly sustained cries....
Understanding self-esteem means understanding the
history of action and its consequences (White, 1963,
p. 134)..
In competence theory, then, we see an emphasis on the individual's
perception of his ability to take action as basic to the development
of a sense of competence, self-esteem, and other clinical phenomena.
This theme is consistent with the work of Seligman (1973) , who defines
depression as "a belief in one's own helplessness" (p. 44) and who
states that "a cure for depression occurs when the individual comes
to believe that he is not helpless and that an individual's sus-
ceptibility to depression depends on the success or failure of his
previous experience with controlling the environment" (p. 43).
Given this theoretical formulation, it is easy to see how decisive-
ness emerges as a basic aspect of psychological adjustment. White is
saying that one must act In order to experience efficacy, an essential
aspect of the development of a sense of competence and self-esteem.
Further, on the basis of repeated past experiences of successful action
on the environment the individual develops a sense of readiness for
future action, for he is confident of his ability to bring about the
desired effect. In the present formulation decisiveness is taken to
be the most important manifestation of the ability to take action.
That is, most of the actions which the individual is called upon to
perform involve making decisions on a conscious level. If the individual
Is ready to take action, one can also say that he is able to make
7decisions, for the subjective component of readiness for action is con-
tained in the experience of reaching decisions when confronted with new
or stressful situations. Finally, the individual who feels competent
to handle these decisions, that is, who is ready to take action as mani-
fested by his decisiveness, is better able to cope with the situation
on an objective level, and subjectively will experience less anxiety,
will be less prone to the feeling of helplessness associated with de-
pression^; etc. It is interesting to note that the above argument does,
in fact, take the antecedents of decisiveness into consideration, namely,
repeated past experiences of effecting successful action upon the envir-
onment, but we are also saying that after a period of time patterns of
decision-making begin to evolve into a semiautonomous behavior which,
although still potentially affected by many determinants, exerts a
strong influence on the individual's reaction to stress.
Ix)cus of control . Another position which relates to decisiveness
is Rotter's Locus of Control Construct, or the "internal-external"
dimension. "Internals" are those individuals who believe that they
possess a measure of control over their life, while "externals" place
the locus of control in outside forces. According to our view that
the perceived ability to control the environment is an important factor
in the development of a sense of competence and self-esteem, we should
expect that the literature and research on locus of control would Indicate
that internals would report higher self-esteem and better coping patterns
than externals. In fact, this is precisely what the literature indicates.
Epstein and Komorita (1970) found that their high-self-esteem subjects
tended to be more internal than their low-self-esteem subjects, and that
8failure in an experimental task was attributed to external factors,
while successes were attributed to internal factors. These data are
consistent with those of Fitch (1970) , who found that subjects employ
loctts of control for purposes of self-enhancement, attributing successes
to internal factors and failures to external factors, and with Hiroto's
conclusions "that externals were more susceptible to learned helplessness
than internals" (Seligman, 1973, p. 45). These data are summarized in
a recent review of the literature on locus of control, in which Joe
(1971) concludes that
...externals describe themselves as anxious, less
able to show constructive responses in overcoming
frustration, and are more concerned with fear of
failure than with achievement per se. Internals,
on the other hand, describe themselves as more con-
cerned with achievement, more constructive in over-
coming frustration, and less anxious (pp. 625-626).
Thus, it is clear that internals tend to cope better, experience
less anxiety, and have higher self-esteem than externals. If we look
carefully at a more precise definition of the I-E dimension, the rela-
tionship of this theoretical construct to our notion of decisiveness
becomes clear. In what is perhaps the most extensive review of the
locus of control literature, Lefcourt (1966) offers the following
definition:
As a general principle, internal control refers to
the perception of positive and/or negative events
as being a consequence of one's own actions and
thereby under personal control; external control
refers to the perception of positive and/or negative
events as being unrelated to one's behaviors in
certain situations and therefore beyond personal
control (p. 207).
In this definition we see the link between "personal control" and
9events being "a consequence of one's own actions." This, of course,
is quite similar to the position stated in competence theory, in which
beliefs about the effectiveness of one's own actions are linked to a
sense of competence, self-esteem, and other coping behaviors. In both
cases, the role of decision-making ability or decisiveness is the same:
one shows his confidence in his ability to take action by the way he
makes decisions. If someone cannot arrive at a decision, this indicates
a problem in taking action, which according to both competence theory
and some of the research on locus of control leads to low self-esteem,
poor coping, and so on. Despite the obvious similarity between the two
positions, however, it is useful to point out a subtle difference,
as this will serve to clarify the relationship of decisiveness to both
of these positions. Competence theory focuses on the feeling one gets
as a function of taking action. Locus of control focuses on one's beliefs
about one's ability to take action. Our notion of decisiveness contains
both of these elements. It is concerned with the process of taking
action in response to various situations, and as such has both a sub-
jective component based upon feelings related to taking action and a
cognitive component based upon one's beliefs about the probable conse-
quences of one's actions.
Cognitive dissonance . A third perspective which bears upon our
interest in decisiveness as a determinant of how individuals cope with
stressful situations is Festinger's (1957) well known dissonance theory.
The essential elements of dissonance theory can be sunmiarized for our
purposes as follows: cognitive dissonance is "a state of psychological
discomfort or tension which motivates efforts to achieve consonance"
10
(Brown, 1965, p. 584), this state being caused by the simultaneous
affinaation of two or more mutually exclusive cognitive elements or
beliefs. Thus, if an individual believes both Statement A and Statement B,
but Statement A Implies the negation of Statement B, then a state of
cognitive dissonance is said to occur, resulting in psychological dis-
comfort and a strong motivation to achieve consonance. As pointed out
by Brehm and Cohen (1962) in their comprehensive review of empirical
studies based on dissonance theory, most often dissonance involves an
Inconsistency between action on the one hand and a belief on the other
hand. Thus, a person may believe that smoking is harmful to health,
but may be unable to stop smoking. They also point out that the comml t-
ment to action is the stronger of the two elements, in that an individual
is more likely to alter a belief in order to reduce dissonance than he
is to alter commitment to action. This point is supported by many
studies (for example, Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959; Aronson and Mills,
1959). Thus, given a state of dissonance resulting from a conflict be-
tween an action and a belief, once the action is taken it becomes easier
to reduce dissonance by altering beliefs than it would be if the indi-
vidual cotild not commit himself to action, thereby remaining in a state
of "limbo."
It follows from this that an individual who is able to take posi-
tive action in the face of a dissonance producing situation will be able
to reduce his cognitive dissonance and thereby the level of anxiety in
the situation. An individual who has difficulty taking such action will
tend to have a more difficult time reducing dissonance. Given Pestingfcr^s
emphasis on the cognitive aspects of this process, it follows that one's
11
perception of his ability to make decisions would bear upon one's
ability to reduce dissonance and Its affective correlate, anxiety. In
other words, given a situation which results In cognitive dissonance,
a decisive Individual who Is able to reduce dissonance by making a
decision which leads to action will experience less anxiety than an
Indecisive Individual who Is unable to take such action because of his
Inability to reach a decision.
Anxiety
. A final perspective which Is related to this notion of
reducing dissonance by taking positive action Is contained In a paper
by Epstein (1970). Actually, this paper surveys and then Integrates
several different viewpoints of anxiety and arrives at a position
which views anxiety as an unpleasant state of diffuse arousal stemming
from three basic sources: primary overstimulation, cognitive incon-
gruity, and response unavailability. These three sources of anxiety
are further specified and refined by Epstein in his discussion of the
distinction between fear and anxiety:
All (examples of anxiety producing situations have) one
thing in common, an inability to channel the arousal
produced by the threat into directed action .... It ap-
pears that to the extent that there is commitment to a
specific avoidance reaction, there is fear, and to the
extent there is indecision, or unavailability of direct
action, there is anxiety, and that there can be various
proportions of fear and anxiety in different situations
....Anxiety is viewed as a state in which the individual
experiences diffuse aroxisal, but is unable to direct
that arousal into purposive action for any of a variety
of reasons, including repression, failure in discrimr-
inatlon, a waiting period between the perception of
threat and possible action, indecision, conflict between
opposing response tendencies, and external restraint
(p. 17).
Related to this view of anxiety as a function of an inability to
12
effect a directed response is the notion of expectancy, for a stress-
ful situation which Is expected Is much more amenable to a directed
response than an unexpected one. Thus, when the Individual feels able
to take directed action In a stressful situation with known parameters,
he experiences less anxiety than In a situation In which such action Is
Impossible because of unknown parameters. As we shall soon see, one
element of decisiveness Is the ability or willingness to define ambiguous
situations, so the decisive Individual Is better able to reduce the un-
certainty and concomitant anxiety of ambiguous situations.
The Implications of Epstein's view of anxiety are far reaching,
and It Is beyond the scope of this research to go Into the Intricacies
of his comprehensive and Involved paper. However, we can quote a
particularly useful passage which brings his perspective into focus
for our purposes:
In sum, because of the nature of their anxiety system,
human beings are intrinsically motivated to structure
their world and to find ways of dealing with it
through action. At relatively low levels of anxiety,
the process is a constructive one, leading to expanded
awareness of reality and increasing control over nature.
At relatively high levies of anxiety, it is apt to pro-
duce retrenchment, including delusional Interpretations
of events (any explanation is better than none) , and
compulsive rituals for dealing with them (any action
is better than none) (p. 19).
The emphasis on action is clear, and we can conclude that the individual
who is able to effect action responses to stressful situations will
cope better. Our position, once again, is that the most iiiq)ortant
observable manifestation of the ability to take action is the decision-
making process, for the individual who is able to reach decisions has
accomplished the most important step in the sequence of events which
13
leads to directed action.
Summary. We are now in a position to integrate the major points
in the four theoretical positions surveyed, and thus more carefully
formulate our view of the importance of decisiveness and the specific
components of decisiveness. Competence theory argues that the exper-
ience of successfully acting on the environment leads to a sense of
competence which both helps the individual to cope with stress and
increases his tendency to take future actions. Rotter's theory is con-
sistent with this, foctising on the importance of one's beliefs in his
ability to affect the environment. Dissonance theory specifies the
cognitive process by means of which concrete action can reduce dissonance
and anxiety. Finally, we have Epstein's emphasis on the ability to
effect a directed response and to reduce xincertainty through action as
important factors in the handling of anxiety. In each of these theo-
retical perspectives emphasis is placed on the ability of the individual
to take action, with a special emphasis on the cognitive component of
the process of effecting action. Thus, the cognitive component is
viewed as basic to the development of a siense of competence, beliefs
about one's ability to exetcise personal control over one's life, the
experien^e^f dissonance, and a basic motivation to structure the world
in order to find ways of dealing with it through action. The dominant,
recurrent theme is that anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, and poor
coping with stress are rooted in the individual's feeling or belief
that he cannot act, that he is helpless, that he does not know what to
do, that he is incompetent to do anything.
Given this theoretical convergence on the ability to take action.
1^
the present investigation concerns the behavior which is fundamental
to the ability to act, namely, the disposition to make decisions. It
is in the experience of reaching a decision that the individual en-
counters the commitment to action and the feeling of efficacy described
above. This point, of course, speaks to our reasons for emphasizing
the phenomenological aspects of decisiveness, for it is one's own view
of his ability to take action \diich leads to feelings of competence,
reduction of dissonance, and so on. This is not to say that social
reinforcement and other external rewards do not add to the feeling of
competence. In fact, social reinforcement can be considered as the
consequence of one's action in the same way as altering the physical
situation^ so one is still talking about the individual's perception
of his ability to effect some desired result. In addition, social
reinforcement is usually directed at the individual's having taken a
good action, not at the action itself. Again, it is the experience of
taking action which leads to praise and the desired result, and decision-
making is a crucial element of taking action.
The above discussion is not intended to imply that decision-making
and action are equivalent phenomena, for action can exist without a
conscious decision to act, and many decisions may involve no observable
"action." However, in such cases (for example, reflexive action or acts
which are so habitual as to occur without conscious decisions) there
is usuedly not an important psychological component which leads to
anxiety, depression, etc. On the other hand, virtually all situations
which can lead to anxiety or other adverse states involve a demand for
conscious action in the form of first making a decision. Thus, an
15
xmderstanding of how an individual handles decisions should afford
information about his readiness to act in stressful situations, and
hence speak to the individual's competence, self-esteem, and level of
anxiety.
In addition to the above theoretical rationale for singling out
decisiveness, there are some practical considerations. First, people
are usually quite aware of their ability to handle decisions. As such,
it makes sense to assume that a self-awareness of this process wotild
contribute to how one copes with situations which require decisions
—
the person who knows that he has trouble with decisions is likely to
experience anxiety when decisions are called for. In addition, the
individual's ready access to his decision-making ability renders an
assessment of decisiveness relatively easy, for one may use self-report
data. Finally, demonstrating that differences in decisiveness correlate
with differences in coping behavior raises the possibility of clinical
intervention in both assessment and treatment of maladaptive coping.
This is not to imply a necessary causal relationship between indecisive-
ness and poor coping, but rather a descriptive relationship, which woiild
still lend itself to clinical intervention. This is based on the ob-
servation that many theories in psychology indicate the efficacy of
"treating" any one of a number of aspects of a problem, whether the
aspect under consideration is a "sj^tom" or a "cause." A good example
of this is the behavioral approach, in which the "symptom" is the focus
of treattnent. In our case, given a phenomenological similarity between
indecisiveness and, say, anxiety under pressure, one may perhaps alleviate
anxiety in response to this pressure by dealing directly with the anxiety
16
or by dealing with the feeling of helplessness (indecisiveness) which
is phenomenologically related to the anxiety. That it is in fact
possible to alter decisiveness even under the constraints of short-term
counseling has been demonstrated by Ryan and Krumbolts (1964) . Indeed,
this may be an easier process than trying to alter feelings of competence,
self-esteem, or specific symptoms such as anxiety or depression.
The Nature of Decisiveness
The above theoretical argument leads us to believe that decisive-
ness is an important factor in the individual's ability to cope with
life and its stresses. We have not explicitly considered the parameters
of decisiveness, nor have we considered the particular patterns of ad-
justment which correlate with decisiveness. Let us proceed to explore
these questions, and then generate a specific hypothesis and a method-
ology to test it.
In the previous pages we were able to conclude that it is the ex-
periential or phenomenological aspect of decisiveness which is of special
interest. The more objective, theoretical aspects of decisiveness, such
as optimal decision-making strategies, effect of payoff, and the like,
are usually less accessible to the awareness of the individual and are
inseparable from such factors as intelligence, ability to generate and
discriminate between alternative solutions, cognitive complexity, and
motivation, all of which are not necessarily related to the individual's
assessment of his ability to make decisions.
What, then, are observable and measurable experiential aspects of
decisiveness? While most of the literature on decision-making deals
17
with those mathematical or theoretical views of declslon-maklag which
are not of direct Interest to us, It Is still possible to extract from
this literature a good sense of what we mean by decisiveness. For ex-
ample, one's confidence In his ability to make decisions Is certainly
an important part of the experience of making decisions. Hammer and
Rlngel (1965) studied confidence in decision-making and concluded "that
lack of confidence in their ability to make accurate decisions may cause
even those who could make accurate decisions on limited amounts of in-
formation to delay taking action" (p. 519). Another aspect of decisive-
ness alluded to above is need for information. Pruitt (1957) found
a positive correlation between the level of manifest anxiety and the
amount of information required in a decision-making task. In both of
these studies, then, Important "adjustment responses" (ability to take
action and manifest anxiety) were seen to relate to need for information
and confidence in decisions. As we shall soon see, these two aspects
of decisiveness will emerge as Important measures of decisiveness In
this research.
Another Important aspect of decisiveness is the extent to which
the individual is willing to tolerate or choose "risky" alternatives
as opposed to conservative or safe courses of action. While this aspect
is probably not as central to decisiveness as need for information and
confidence in decisions, it does reflect an implicit attitude held
by the individual related to his competence as a decision-maker. If
he feels he can make the "right" decision, then he would be more likely
to opt for risky alternatives. This position is strongly supported in
Jellison and Risklnd (1970) , which examines a grefit deal of literature
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on risk taking and concludes that there is a close relationship between
risk taking and perceived ability. A good discussion of this risky-
conservative dimension is found in Kogan and Wallach (1964) , and their
work forms the basis of one of our measures of decisiveness.
There are other aspects of decisiveness which are of interest to
us. For example, Ivan Steiner and his research associates at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts have recently initiated a line of investigation
involving one's tendency to defer decisions to others. This dimension
seems to relate to the individual's view of his ability to handle de-
cisions, and as such would certainly have a bearing on what we have been
calling decisiveness. Other important aspects of decisiveness are one's
satisfaction with his decisions, the significance one attributes to
making "good decisions," and the number of decisions one feels he must
make in his daily life.
Before attempting to elaborate on these dimensions so as to generate
a meaningful line of research, let us look at how some of them have
previously been found to relate to personality factors and psychological
adjustment. Milner, Beech and Walker (1971) found that obsessive
subjects ask for more information prior to making a decision than normals*
Harris (1970) also focused on the amount of information demanded by a
decision-maker as related to personality factors. Other studies relat-
ing aspects of decision-making behavior to personality variables in-
clude Gentile and Schipper (1966) , which emphasizes risk-taking behavior.
Ivan Steiner, personal communication
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and Pollay (1970), focusing on decision time and difficulty of decisions.
One series of studies which is particularly relevant to the present re-
search is that of Denner (1968a, 1968b) , who examined need for informa-
tion and a high concern for the real-unreal distinction as decision-
making variables which have far-reaching implications. His conclusions
are instructuve:
to the extent that the decision-maker becomes involved
in the process of decision-making rather than in the
ultimate effects of decision-making, he may deceive
others through failure to act .... Could the repeated
failure to act when direct action is called for, coupled
with the suppression that one has failed, produce a
condition wherein the individual is plagued with vague
feelings of uneasiness called anxiety (1968a, p. 531)?
These studies and others (some of which will be cited later in our
description of our measures) all deal with one or more of a limited
number of aspects of decision-making which were related to other clinical
variables. It is not assumed that these dimensions exhau&t all possible
aspects of decisiveness, but they do seem to include the most central
aspects. We will now look more closely at these dimensions of decisive-
ness, paying particular attention to how they relate to each other and
how ftach of them addresses itself to a slightly different aspect.
Earlier in this chapter decisiveness was defined as the ability of
the individual to engage in the decision-making process. Each of the
dimensions of decisiveness we will be focusing on assesses a particular
aspect of one's ability to engage in the decision-making process, and
further looks at decision-making from a particular vantage point. Thus,
some dimensions relate to the person's assessment of his performance on
particular decision-making tasks, while others look at one's general
confidence in decision-making situations or one's readiness to accept
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responsibility for decisions. Our dimensions of decisiveness can also
be classified according to the nature of the "data source." Thus, one
nay elicit information about an individual's decision-making ability
by measuring performance on a decision-making task, by asking the
individual how confident or satisfied he is with his performance on
a task, by being even more direct and asking the individual directly
how he sees his decision-making ability, or by asking someone else
who knows him how good a decision-maker he is. All of these dimensions,
by tapping both a number of aspects of the decision-making process and
a number of "data sources," complement each other in yielding a compre-
hensive view of an individxial ' s ability to engage in the decision-making
process.
We can now be more specific as to the particular dimensions of
decisiveness which are of interest in this research. As mentioned above,
one of the most important dimensions of decisiveness is need for informa-
tion prior to making a decision, a factor which has been recognized in
previous research as quite central to the decision-making process. An
assessment of how much information an individual requires before reach-
ing a decision affords a basic insight into the question of his readiness
to take action, which of course is at the theoretical basis of this
research. This dimension will therefore constitute one of our major
areas of interest.
Another dimension mentioned above is one's tendency to choose risky
alternatives as opposed to conservative, safe courses of action. For
our purposes (and partially as a function of the nature of the instru-
ment we will be using to measure this dimension) we will refer to this
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aspect of decisiveness simply as Risk Taking . As in the case of Need
For Information, an assessment of an Individual's Risk Taking behavior
speaks directly to one's readiness to take action, for if one demands a
high 14val of certainty before pursuing a particular alternative, one
is less likely to feel able to take effective action in the many
decleion-making situations which entail high uncertainty.
We have also already mentioned two other dimensions. Confidence in
pe<^isio^8 and Tendency to Defer Decisions , as being relevant to the
decision-making process, particularly in terms of one's subjective
feelings about one's ability to make decisions. Looking at all four
dimensions for a moment, it can be seen that they all would seem to be
fairly contingent on specific decision-making situations, for one's "score"
on each of them may vary considerably as a function of the kind of de-
cision being made. That is, one may require a great amount of informa-
tion and a high level of certainty in one situation, but not in another,
and in order to assess these dimensions, it would seem quite necessary
to supply the individual with such a specific decision-making situation.
In addition to the fact that they are all "situation-specific,"
these dimensions share another quality, in that they are not subjective
or phenonenological. That is, they do not actually relate to an indi-
vidual's own assessment of how good a decision-maker he thinks he is,
but rather they examine specific aspects of how an individual performs
in the decision-making process. Thus, even though one may use a "self-
report" procedure for assessing one's confidence in a decision or his
tendency to defer a decision, one is itill Involved in a specific
decision-making situation related to actual performance. In order to
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gain inflight into the more purely subjective sense one may have of his
own decision-making ability, a fifth dimension needs to be added to
our list, a dimension we shall call Self Appraisal of Decisiveness . By
this we mean exactly what the name implies, a global, impressionistic
assessment by the individual himself of his own decision-making ability.
While we could no doubt generate a number of other dimensions of
decisiveness, only one other will be added. This dimension is similar
to the preceding one in that it employs a global assessment of decisive-
ness, but it has the important distinction of objectivity in terms of
the data source. Thus, our sixth dimension is the Peer Rating of
Decisiveness
. which involves an assessment of an individual's ability
to make decisions from the perspective of someone else who knows the
decision-maker.
These six dimensions of decisiveness, then, all tap different
aspects of the decision-making process stemming from a variety of
sources of data. Our use of a nximber of dimensions of decision-making
behavior is consistent with our two-fold goal for this research Implied
In the title: (1) understanding more about the nature of decisiveness
as a characteristic of individuals, and (2) learning something about the
relationship of decisiveness to psychological adjustment. In the first
case, the goal will be achieved by obtaining a number of measures of
decisiveness from a variety of sources » and then looking at the rela-
tionship between the various measures and how they interact with each
other in relation to our measures of psychological adjustment. Our
second goal will be addressed by obtaining a number of measures of both
psychological adjustment and level of performance in a variety of
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situations, and then relating these data to the decisiveness measures.
Before presenting our major hypothesis which specifies the relationship
between the decisiveness and adjustment measures, it is necessary to
discuss the particular dimensions of adjustment which would be most
useful to examine.
Adjustment and Performance Dimensions
We will discuss the specific instruments in the next chapter, but
it is appropriate here to discuss, from the theoretical perspective,
our choice of certain kinds of indicators of psychological adjustment
and level of performance. Some of the dimensions which will be used
have already been discussed in relation to the theoretical background
of this research. These include self-esteem, level of anxiety in rela-
tion to a stressful situation, satisfaction with life, and depression.
Our intention in retaining these dimensions of adjustment as focal
points for this research is to obtain a relatively broad picture of the
individual's adjustment and reaction to stress. In addition to these
aspects of adjustment, other areas of interest emerge from both the
literature and from one's intuitive sense of how decisiveness may affect
other areas of ftinctioning. Thus, obsessiveness would seem to be a
worthwhile trait to examine, for it both reflects a style of cognition
which closely parallels the individual's actual decision-making process
(examining fine detail, feeling doubt about one's actions, and so on) and
speaks to the individual's patterns of handling stress and coping with
life.
Additional indicators of psychological adjustment which might
relate to decisiveness are the level of resentment one feels and social
24
or Interpersonal factors like alienation from others and anomie. These
dimensions are relevant in that they tap both the individual's reaction
to his life situation (resentment) and his feeling in the interpersonal
area of his life. Both of these areas clearly may be affected by one's
ability to negotiate the nxjmerous decisions one faces in daily life.
Finally, some more objective measures of the individual's ability
to perform in normal life situations would be of interest, including
indicators of academic performance and ratings made by others as to
the individual's overall performance in a number of areas. Taken
together, these dimensions of adjustment and level of performance should
afford a wide ranging sample of an individual's overall ability to cope
with life and its stresses.
Hypothesis
The general and overriding hypothesis which emerges from this posi-
tion is that decisive individtials show better psychological adjustment
and a higher level of performance than indecisive ones . Stated more
specifically, a person who has a difficult time making decisions and
who perceives himself as a poor decision-maker also has a difficult
time coping with life and its stresses.
Given the fact that the present investigation involves a number
of dimensions of decisiveness, it is important to note a premise which
is Implicit in this hypothesis, and which itself is of interest as a
subject of this research. This premise is that the various dimensions
of decisiveness correlate with each other . For example, it is expected
that a person who shows a high need for information before making a
decision will also tend to defer decisions more to others, demand
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greater certainty before choosing a risky alternative, think of himself
as a poor decision-maker, and so on. This premise is important in that
It speaks to both the relationship between decisiveness and psychological
adjustment and the question of whether decisiveness is a general trait
Incorporating all of the dimensions discussed above, or whether it is
actually a multidimensional concept with little relationship between the
various dimensions.
TWO points of clarification are in order here. First, the hypothesis
is intended to be correlational or descriptive, rather than causal. It
Is not being claimed that Indecisiveness causes anxiety or depression or
low self-esteem, but rather that these phenomena are closely related in
a functional way. This kind of relationship is consistent with the
phenomenological emphasis presented in our theoretical discussion.
The second point of clarification is based on the fact that, while
it is expected that the various dimensions of decisiveness will correlate
with each other, it is also expected that some dimensions will relate^^
more strongly to particular aspects of psychological adjustment than
will other dimensions. In fact, our theoretical emphasis on the sub-
jective or phenomenological aspects of decisiveness suggests that the
more subjective dimensions of decisiveness will show the strongest
relationship to psychological adjustment.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
The following methodology is designed with a number of purposes
la mind. First, it is Intended to distinguish between decisive and
Indecisive subjects on all of the major dimensions of decisiveness
mentioned in the preceding chapter. Different types of measures, in-
cluding aelf-report, structured laboratory procedures, and peer ratings
are used in order to obtain data on the validity of our measures and
concepts, and to increase the scope of the questions we can address.
The adjustment measures also use a combination of self-report, peer
ratings, and objective Indicators of performance. The measures are also
chosen with the intention of striking a balance between controlled lab-
oratory procedures and data collected in actual, "real life" situations.
Taken together, the data obtained through these measures are intended
to afford a fairly comprehensive picture of the relationship between
decisiveness and psychological adjustment.
Subjects
Students in a number of undergraduate psychology courses at a
large state university were asked to participate in a study of decision-
making in various kinds of situations, and were given course credit
for their participation. Over 250 volunteers (out of an estimated
1000 students enrolled in the courses) reported to the testing sessions,
with virtually all of them falling into the 18-22 year old age group,
and approximately 60% being female. Of this group, 228 (120 females,
108 males) subjects returned valid, complete questionnaires. The fact
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that only 25Z of potential subjects volunteered and that more of them
were females suggests a possible sampling bias, a question we will con-
sider later. The subjects reported In groups of approximately 30 to
the testing session, during which the major measures of decisiveness and
psychological adjustment were administered. At the conclusion of each
session (which lasted approximately 90 minutes) all subjects were re-
quested to supply the names and addresses of two friends or relatives
(sex and age were not specified) who would be willing to complete a short
questionnaire. The subjects' own addresses were also obtained so that
a follow-up questionnaire could be sent to them.
Measures and Procedures
The subjects began the experimental session with the central
measure of Need For Information, an Instrument called the Expanded
Judgment Task. This Instrument Is also the basis for the measure of
Confidence In Decisions. It requires the subject to make decisions on
ths basis of a limited amount of Information, with the option to demand
additional Information before reaching a decision. In this way, data
as to the amoijnt of Information required before reaching a decision Is
obtained, along xrlth a confidence rating for each decision.
The specific procedure was as follows: each subject received three
decks of cards, with each card consisting of a picture of either a
square or a circle. All subjects received Identical sets of cards, in
which the number of circles and the previously randomized order of
prasentatlon In each deck was the same for all subjects. Subjects were
informed both In written directions and through oral description by the
experimenter that the task Is to make a decision as to the ratio of
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•qxiares to circles as soon as one believes he has seen enough of the 50
cards to reach this decision, with the "hint" that the number of drcUa
and squares Is a multiple of 5. Finally, a scoring system was described
In which more "points" are awarded for early decisions than for late:
ones, with no points being awarded for an Incorrect decision. Thus,
the subjects have an Incentive for making an early decision, but also
must balance this against the "risk" of being Incorrect and losing all
points. Actually, the only scores which are Important In this research
are the numbers of cards required before making each of the three
dadslons. In addition, however, each subject was asked to give a con-
fidence rating, on a scale of 1 to 10, after each decision was made.
Thus, this Instrument yields an assessment of both the subject's Need
For Information and Confidence In Decisions.
This experimental procedure has been used extensively In previous
rMearch. Singer and Roby (1967) used essentially the same technique
to naasure Information required before reaching a decision, substituting
colored chips for geometrical figures, a procedure also used saccess*
fully by Irwin, Smith and Mayfleld (1956), Irwin and Smith (1957) and
Pruitt (1961) . A tachlstlscoplc version was used by Andrews and Boldt
(1965) and Croft (1962). In the Singer and Roby (1967) study and in
Audley (196A) , the use of this measure as both a direct assessment of
xiMd for information and an Indirect assessment of time required before
rMching a decision Is discussed. The use of geometrical designs
printed on cards was used by Brody (1963) , and Is an adaptation of the
probability learning method of Jarvlk (1951). In the present research
vtt followed Brody' 8 administration procedure, the directions for which
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«r« Included in the Appendix, along with a sample scoring sheet.
Following the administration of this Instrument, which took approx-
imately 20 to 30 minutes, two questionnaire-type instruments assessing
other dimensions of decisiveness were administered. The first of these
is the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (Wallach and Kogan, 1959; Kogan and
Wallach, 1961, 1964; and Wallach, Kogan, and Bem, 1962), a 12-ltem
device which assesses the subject's tendency to choose risky or cautious
alternatives in a variety of situations requiring decisions. Previous
research xising this instrument has reported satisfactory reliability
•tatiatics (Wallach and Kogan, 1961; Wallach et al . . 1962; Kogan and
Wallach, 1964) , and its self-report format is consistent with our
theoretical emphasis on the experience of making decisions. This taak
xaqxilres the subject to decide what level of certainty of outcome he
would demand before opting for a particularly risky, but quite desirable*
alternative. The score consists of the average level of risk acceptable
to the subject across all 12 items,with a high score corresponding to a
willingness to make a risky decision (low guarantee of success), and
therefore to decisive behavior. Clearly, this instrument is being uaed
to tap what we have called the dimension of Risk Taking. A copy of
this Instrument is found in the Appendix.
Thus far, three of the dimensions of decisiveness have been
addraaaed by the two instruments described above. The next inotxuaant
la specifically designed to tap our fourth dimension. Tendency to Defer
Daclaiona. This is a 10-ltem instrument which presents different
deciaion-making situations to the subject, with the request that he
ala^ly note on a 7-point scale his feeling as to whether he would sake
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th« decialon himself or instead choose to defer to someone else. The
•core for this measure Is the average tendency to defer decisions to
othttrs, across all 10 items, with a low score indicating a low tendency
to defer, and hence decisive behavior. As this instrument has only
recently been developed, reliability and validity statistics are not
available, so we will pay close attention to this in our data analysis.
copy of this test is contained in the Appendix.
Although subjects were generally able to work at their own pace
with thastt three decisiveness instruments, a short break was introduced
In the session at about this point, and subjects were encouraged to
Mk any questions they might have. They were also encouraged to give
thair beat possible performance, and then were told that the results of
this research would be made available to them at a later date. In addi-
tion to supplying this information, the break was useful in that the
remaining instruments were of a very different sort, and a short rest
Meaed appropriate.
The rest of the instruments administered during this session were
actually combined into one comprehensive questionnaire, divided into
•everal parts. This entire questionnaire is contained in the Appendix,
just as presented to the subjects, with the exception that labals ara
added when necessary to inform the reader as to which questions tap
which dimension of decisiveness or adjustment.
Tha first part of this questionnaire is a "pure" self-report
Msaisnant of the individual's perception of his own ability to make
dacisions. This part was developed by the researcher, and simply aska
tha subjact seven direct questions about his decision-making ability.
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This is our Self Appraisal of Decisiveness Measure. Next, some general
background data Is elicited from the subject, Including year at school,
n*jor, religion, sex, participation In extracurricular activities, drug
use, plans to seek psychdloglcal guidance, and so on. Following this,
the first measures of psychological adjustment are presented. This part
of the questionnaire is actually a combination of self-report devices
which have been used in previous research to assess satisfaction with
life and specific components of satisfaction. A detailed description
of these two items is contained in Robinson and Shaver (1969), along
with a discussion of reliability and validity of the data. Their utility
is suannarlzed in the following quotation: "While the use of such global
measures obscures known complexities in these assessments. .. .they do
produce predictable findings with uncommon regularity" (p. 11). The
first Item is a three alternative question used by Gurin, Vemoff , and
Feld (1960) , and again by Bradbum az^d Caplovitz (1965) . The second
Item^ls a three alternative question of life satisfaction used by
Converse and Robinson (1965). These items are the first two questions
In the part called Self Appraisal Questionnaire. Part 2 (see Appendix).
The next instniment is a more comprehensive series of questions
which generates data on a number of dimensions of psychological adjust-*
nent, including satisfaction with life, self-esteem, lack of social
support (alienation), anomie, depression, sadness, and resentment* Ths
us* of this instrument is reported in Bachman et al . (1967). Finally,
the last part of this questionnaire consists of the 18 itons from the
MKPI which have been shown to cluster around the trait of obsesslveness
(scale 131, or the "neurotic overcontrol scale," developad by Block, 1953).
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The completion of this questionnaire and the instruments previously
described, then, generates some wide ranging data on the subjects'
decisiveness and adjustment in a number of areas. At the conclusion of
the administration of these measures, names and addresses of friends or
relatives were obtained from each subject, so that the Peer Rating
Questionnaires could be sent out, along with the addresses of the sub-
jects themselves, so that a Final Self Appraisal could be mailed at a
later date. The first of these mailed questionnaires, the Peer Rating
Questionnaire, consisted of the identical items found in the Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness, except that the wording was changed to the
"third person" instead of the "first person." This measure is our Peer
Bating of Decisiveness. Along with this instrument are some additional
questions about how the peer sees the subject's social and academic
performance. We shall refer to this series of questions as the Peer
Rating of Performance.
The Final Self Appraisal Questionnaire was mailed to coincide with
the time of final examinations, because part of its function was to
assess the subject's reaction to a stressful situation. This part of
the questionnaire asks the subject to rate his anxiety in relation to
final examinations, and constituted or measure of anxiety under stress.
This Instrument is modelled after the rating scales used by Janls (1958)
In his studies of anxiety associated with hospital treatment, and have
yielded reliable results. Following these five items, a number of
additional questions assess the subjects' expectations and satisfaction
vith academic and social life. These latter items constitute our Self
Appraisal of Performance. Subjects were asked to return this questionnaire
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In person, so that they could be given some preliminary written feed-
back on the experiment and so that some short Interviews could be con-
ducted by this researcher to gain some open-ended insight into how the
subjects saw their decisiveness and its relationship to adjustment. Both
of the mailed questionnaires along with a copy of the written feedback
given to subjects are found in the Appendix.
The methodological distinctions between these measures, which
exactly parallel the theoretical distinctions between the dimensions they
are designed to tap, will be quite important in our interpretation of
results, so it is well to specify them here. Recalling our earlier
classification of the detlslveness dimensions, we note that the measures
can be classified according to both the format for data collection and
the data source. Thus, we have four behavioral, task-oriented measures
(Need For Information, Confidence in Decisions, Risk Taking, and Tendency
to Defer Decisions) as contrasted with two global, impressionistic
measures. In this classification according to format for data collection,
our theoretical emphasis on the phenomenological approach to decisiveness
suggests that the impressionistic measures would relate more strongly to
decisiveness. On the other hand, in terms of data source we would group
the four behavioral instruments together with the peer rating measure,
for both the peer ratings and the behavioral measures are objective
assessments of decision-making behavior. That is, they are based on
decision-making performance . either in a laboratory task or as observed
by someone else. Self Appraisal of Decisiveness clearly represents the
opposite extreme, being based on the subjective view of the subject
himself.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The following presentation of results is concerned with two funda-
mental and interrelated questions. The first question can be viewed as
essentially methodological, and it Includes test validity of the indi-
vidual measures and intercorrelations between measures. However, thle
question also helps to shed light on the nature of decisiveness as
reflected by our measures. The second question concerns the relationship
between the decisiveness and adjustment measures, which is the major
focus of this investigation. The strong interrelationship of these two
questions is seen in the fact that any interpretation of relationships
between decisiveness and adjustment measures must take into considera-
tion any results which can be attributed to measurement variables.
Because of the great amount of data bearing on each of these questions,
the data will be presented in stages, looking first at the test validity
of the measures and then at the relationship between the decisiveness
and adjustment measures. The question of measurement contamination of
results, or "methods variance," will be considered at several points
in this presentation, using data from both of the major stages.
Test Validity of the Measures
The question of test validity is important in any research Involv-
ing clinical variables and such diffuse concepts as "decisiveness,"
and a valuable discussion of this whole question can be found in
Chronbach and Meehl (1955). In the present research, the qixestion of
test validity Is important in two respects. First, it is important to
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determine If the various Items on a given Instrument correlate signi-
ficantly with each other, such that we are justified In considering a
single, total score for that Instrument. This also relates to whether
or not a particular Instrument is tapping a single dimension, or
whether It Itself Is multl-dlmenslonal. Second, It Is Important to
determine If the various measures of decisiveness correlate with each
other. Implying an overriding trait of "decisiveness," or whether the
various measures of decisiveness tap entirely different and unrelated
aspects of decisiveness.
Internal reliability of the measures . The first question was
addressed In a number of ways, for it is Important to determine the
reliability of the various Instruments used in this study. There are
six major measures of decisiveness, which for statistical purposes can
be thought of as our independent var^-^bles, with each variable tapping
a partlctilar aspect of the decision-making process in a different way.
Thus, we have Need For Information scores, consisting of three separate
trials of the Expanded Judgsient Task; the Confidence in Decisions scores,
also based on the three trials of the Expanded Judgment Task; the Ten-
dency to Defer Decisions scores, based on the 10 items of Stelner*s
scale; the Risk Taking scores, based on the 12 items of the Choice
Dilemma Questionnaire; the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness scores, based
on the seven point scale developed by the researcher; and finally, the
Peer Rating of Decisiveness scores, aimed at validating the subject's
own self-appraisal.
The initial statistical procedures consisted of securing Pearson
Product Correlation Coefficients, pairing each individual item on a
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given measure with every other Item and with the total score for that
measure. These inter-item and item-total correlations afford a picture
of the internal reliability of each of the major independent measures.
The results, which are summarized in Table 1, lead to the following
conclusions for each of the independent measures:
^) Need For Information - Correlation coefficients between
scores for each of the three trials range from .64 to .71,
and correlation coefficients between scores for each trial
and the total score range from .86 to .90, all coefficients
being significant at the .001 level. Thus, we observe very
high internal reliability, and are therefore justified in
considering a single, total score for this dimension.
2) Confidence in Decisions - Results here are almost identical
to the Need For Information results, with inter-item cor-
relation coefficients ranging from .62 to .69, and item-
total correlations ranging from .87 to .90 (p <• .001). The
similarity is expected, of course, given that these two
measures were based on different aspects of the same decision-
making task. Thus, we are justified in using the total score
as our measure of Confidence in Decisiona.
3) Risk Taking - Here, the results are somewhat less significant,
but still within acceptable limits. The item-total correla-
tion coefficients range from .38 to .52, all significant at
the .001 level. Most of the inter-item correlation coefficients
lie in the range of .20, which is also significant at the .001
level. However, a number of lower correlations occur, along
with an occasional negative correlation, but none of the
negative correlations are statistically significant. Thus,
we observe consistently high item-total correlations, and
predominantly positive, significant inter-item correlations,
and we are therefore justified in considering the total score
for Risk Taking. We will look more closely at these results
with the help of factor analytic techniques and split-half
reliability correlations later.
4) Tendency to Defer Decisions - In this case, the restxlts are
much more ambiguous, making it difficult to justify consid-
ering the ten items together as a single scale. As can be
seen in Table 1, there are a great many non-significant and
even negative correlations between items, and while all
Itemr-total correlations are significant, they are of much
smaller magnitude than in the other measures. Although it
it difficult to make a final assessment on the basis of
these data, it appears that this is a multidimenalooal scales
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In that items do not correlate well with each other, but
that these differences balance with each other such that
significant correlations are observed between each item and
the total score. Thus, any use of the total score as a
reliable indication of "tendency to defer decisions" must
take into account these poor inter-item correlations. We
will have more to say on this measure later.
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness - These correlational data are
much more clear. Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 all correlate quite
highly with each other and with the total score, while items
5 and 6 yield lower correlations with all the other items and
with the total score. Now, looking briefly at the content of
Items 5 and 6 (see Appendix)
, we note that these two questions
deal with whether big or small decisions are more difficult,
while the other items all tap a more general dedlsion-making
ability. On the basis of these data and the factor analytic
data which will be discussed below, we may conclude that it
makes the best sense to consider the total of items 1, 2, 3,
4, and 7 as the total score for Self Appraisal of Decisiveness.
6) Peer Rating of Decisiveness - Before looking at the data in
Table 1 for this measure, a point of clarification is in order.
During the administration of the laboratory instruments,
the names of two peers or relatives of each subject were
secured, thus yielding two sets of "Peer Ratings" for each
subject. It turned out that one peer rating form was returned
for almost all subjects (209 out of 228), but only 149 subjects
had both forms returned. If we considered only those subjects
for whom both peer rating forms had been received, our sample
size would have been reduced by over 25% for the remaining
analyses. However, since there was a strong correlation
between the two peer rating forms when both were available
(r-.36, p < .001) and also between each individual form and the
total of both forms (r».81, .84, p < .001), it was decided to
consider only the first peer's decisiveness ratings, that
i8,< ottly one of the peer rating forms for each subject*
Therefore, the data in Table 1 are based on the ratings
of a single peer, but they have been shown to be a valid
indication of both peers' ratings. The conclusions to be
reached are identical with those described above for Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness, with items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 corre-
lating most strongly with each other.
These preliminary analyses, then, show that we are justified in
using a single score for Need For Information, Confidence In Decisions,
Risk Taking, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and Peer Rating of Decisive-
ness. That is, these measures are based on individual trials or individual
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Items which correlate highly with each other and with a total score for
all Items. We may also conclude, at least tentatively, that the Items
Included In the total score for a given measure tap the same dimension
of decisiveness. Howvcr, to further Investigate this, and to help
clarify the ambiguous results on Tendency to Defer Decisions, additional
statistical procedures are needed.
First, split-half reliability measures were obtained for the Items
on the Risk Taking and Tendency to Defer Decision Instruments. Separ-
ating the Items on each scale Into odd-numbered and even-numbered groups,
total scores were calculated for each group, which were then correlated
with total scores for the other group. Correlation coefficients of
.52 (p < .001) between the split-halves of Risk Taking and of -.03 (not
significant) between the split-halves of Tendency to Defer Decisions
were observed. Thus, In the case of Risk Taking, we are further justified
in considering the items together as a single score, but our initial
skepticism about the Items constituting Tendency to Defer Decisions is
increased, for the two halves do not correlate with each other.
A final procedure was used to help shed light on the composition
of the Tendency to Defer Decisions scale, factor analysis.^ These data
are summarized in Table 2, in which factor loadings (oblique solution)
and the percent of variance accounted for by each factor are shown.
It is apparent from these data that each of the factors is accounting
The computer program which was used for the factor analyses is des-
cribed in Nle, Bent, and Hull (1970). Initial factors were extracted
with Iteration, then rotated to an oblique solutioil, with Delta (degree
of obliqueness) equal to 0. The program was run on a CDC 3600 computer
at the University of Massachusetts.
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TiBLB 2
Ikoter Loadings for Itons on Tendency to Defer Decisions sad
Baroeat of VsrlAneo Accounted for tiy Bach Factor
Items FVetor I Faotor II Factor III Factor lY ft^etor Y
1 -.38 .05 -.15 -.01 -.04
2
.30 -.05
-.22
-.20 •04
3 .01 .16
-.03 •04
-.35
.38 .28 .00
• 16 -•05
5 .14 -.02
.66
-•03
-.03
6
.01
.17 -.06
.09 •44
7 -.02
• 11 .02
-.56 -.06
8
.26 .04
.05 -.06 •01
9 -.17
.05 .05 -.05
.03
10 -.03
.59 •00 -.15 .01
Faotor Conposition and Percent of Yariance Acoomted for "by eeeh Factor
Factor Item Coaposltion Psrcent of Yariaace
I -1, 2, 4, 8 27.6
II 10, 4 24^9
III 5 18.9
lY -7 15.1
Y -3» 6 13.6
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for a significant percentage of the total variance, so we are dealing
with a multidimensional scale. Given this result, a second split-half
reliability test was performed, grouping the items in such a way as to
make sure that there was a mixture of items from a given factor in both
2
halves. This would help to rule out any speculation that the original
split-half results were an artifact of having coincidentally split the
halves according to major factors. The results were essentially identi-
cal to the initial split-half, with r^.02, a non-significant correlation.
Thus, this scale does not seem to be measuring a single trait of
"tendency to defer decisions," but rather a number of dimensions, so
caution must be exercised in drawing any conclusions from data based
on a total score for this scale. Yet, because of the relatively high
item-total correlations observed, we will "play with" the total score
in some of our analyses in order to see if any more light can be shed
on this dimension.
These preliminary analyses, all dealing with the reliability of
the measures used, enable us to conclude that with the exception of
the Tendency to Defer Decisions scale, each of our measures demonstrates
good internal reliability, and we may therefore consider the total
score for each measure. This, of course, does not speak to the question
of the validity of the measures, but only to their internal reliability.
We now begin to address this question with a look at the relationship
between the various measures of decisiveness.
^alf A - items 1,6,8,9,10. Half B «= items 2,3,4,5,7.
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Correlations among the measures of decisiveness . As In the case
of our assessment of internal reliability, we begin now with a matrix
of correlation coefficients, this time pairing the total score for each
of the decisiveness measures with the total score for every other de-
cisiveness measure. The matrix is contained in Table 3, and leads to
the following observations:
1) Need For Information and Confidence in Decisions correlate
fairly well (r=.2A, p < .001) with each other, with confidence
increasing as need for information increases. The direction of
this correlation is somewhat unexpected, for high Need For
Information corresponds to indecisive behavior, while high
Confidence in Deciaions corresponds to decisive behavior.
However, this result makes sense in terms of methodological
and theoretical factors. Thus, both dimensions are tapped
by the same instrument, so it is possible that methods factors
account for the positive relationship. More importantly, one
could make the theoretical argument that one tends to feel
"safer" and thus ipore confident with a greater amount of in-
formation, so confidence is not really a measure of "decisive-
ness" as such but only a function of how "safe" a person judges
his decision to be.
2) The four behavioral measures. Need for Information, Confidence
in Decisions, Risk Taking, and Tendency to Defer Decisions tend
to correlate with each other at a significance level of .05,
with the exception of the pairing of Risk Taking and Tendency
to Defer Decisions. However, the correlation coefficients are
small, so much of the variance is unaccounted for.
3) The two impressionistic, global measures (Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness) do not correlate
with any of the other decisiveness measures, but they do
correlate with each other. The one exception is that Self •
Appraisal of Decisiveness does correlate with Tendency to
Defer Decisions. This observed correlation between the be-
havioral measures on the one hand, and among the impressionistic
measures on the other hand, speaks for convergent validity of
the decisiveness measures within the two observational modes,
but not across modes.
We are now in a position to begin to formulate some of the above
analyses in theoretical terms. Beginning with six different instruments
designed to tap aspects of decision-making behavior, we have looked at
TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix of Relationship laetween Decisiveness Measures
Need For Confidence Risk Tendency Self Ap- Peer
viPAOfTDTpa Informa- in Taking to Defer apraisal RatingMJiASUHba tion Decisions _ Decisions of Dec, of Dec
NFI 1.00
CID
RT
TDD
SAD
PRD
.24*** .15* .13* .05 .06
1.00 .14* .01 .04 .04
1.00 .09 .02 .03
1.00 .16** .11
1.00 .21**
1.00
** pC.OOl
** p< .01
* P<.05
45
the Internal composition of each instrument and found that all but one
yielded data which justify considering the instrument in its entirety,
as a single measure of some aspect of decision-making. In the other
case, the results are ambiguous, but it seems to be a multidimensional
scale. Finally, a correlation was observed between most of the behavior-^
al, task-oriented instruments, no relationship between the behavioral and
impressionistic instruments, and a positive relationship between the
two impressionistic measures. In all cases of interrelationships between
decisiveness measures, however, correlations are rather low even when
significant, so we are clearly not accounting for a great deal of the
variance and thus are missing much of what constitutes decisiveness.
The conclusion which emerges for this is that we do have a number of
instruments which are reliably measuring some aspects of decisiveness
(given the face validity of our measures) , but each instrument seems
to be tapping a slightly different aspect, and the greatest distinction
is that between the behavioral Instruments and the impressionistic self
and peer appraisals. This last point is particularly important, given
our interest in the phenomenological approach to decisiveness. At this
point our main conclusion is that our measures are not tapping a single,
global trait of decisiveness, but rather a number of dimensions which
do bear some relationship to each other. Of course, even the relatively
low correlations which were observed must be interpreted in the light of
possible contamination due to methods factors. We will address this
question shortly.
CorrelatlonK amonp; the measures of adjustment . As outlined in
the preceding chapter, the adjustment measures consist of a number of
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multi-item scales, both self-report and peer rating, along with some
objective backgrovind and performance data and a number of single,
specific questions about drug use, coping with stress, and so on. By «
way of summary, the multi-item adjustment measures are: General Self
Appraisal (see Appendix), Satisfaction in Life, Self-esteem, Alienation,
Anomie, Depression, Sadness, Obsessiveness
,
Resentment, Anxiety on
Exams, Peer Rating of Subject's Performance, and Self Appraisal of Per-
formance. The objective adjustment and performance indicators include
Grade Point Average, Verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test, Mathematics
Scholastic Aptitude Test, report of drug use to cope with stress, report
of physical symptoms as a reaction to stress, and report of desire for
psychological guidance. The background data include the subjects' sex,
year at school, religion, and participation in extracurricular and
athletic activities.
The same statistical procedures used earlier were applied here to
determine the internal reliability of our multi-item adjustment measures,
these data can be summarized quite readily, for essentially the same
results were observed for each of the major adjustment measures. Inter-
item correlations for each measure range from .20 to .50, and item-
total correlations rajige from .40 to .89, with all correlation coefficients
being significant beyond the .001 level. Thus, our multi-item scales
which tap various aspects of psychological adjustment all yield inter-
nally reliable results, and we are justified in using only the total
score for each scale.
Looking next at correlations between the various measures of ad-
justment, a correlation matrix pairing the total score for each
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adjustment measure with the total score for every other measure was
generated. These data are also straightforward. All of the measures
tend to correlate fairly well with each other at a level of significance
beyond the .001 level. The only major exceptions are that Anxiety on
Examinations does not correlate significantly with most of the measures,
and Self Appraisal of Performance does not correlate with Obsessiveness.
No reason for these exceptions is apparent, but this question will be
addressed in our discussion of methods variance. At this point, however,
we are justified in concluding that because of the strong relationship
between these measures, we can consider a total score for these
measures (excluding Anxiety on Examinations) in addition to the scores
for each measure separately. Because of the fact that some of these
measures represent "positive" traits while others represent "negative"
traits, the scoring of the negative dimensions (Depression, Alienation,
Anomie, and so on) was reversed, so our new variable. Overall Adjust-
ment, is homogenous ia scoring, with a high score representing better
adjustment.
We have, then, a number of decisiveness and adjustment measures
which are based on multi-item scales that have been shown to be in-
ternally reliable, and in the case of the adjustment measures, to
correlate well with each other. It is our next task to look at the
relationship of the decisiveness measures to the adjustment measures.
Relationship Between Decisiveness and Adjustment Measures
In order to obtain as broad an overview as possible of the relation-
ship between our decisiveness measures and all of the adjustment measures.
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a comprehensive series of t-tests was performed. Specifically, the
distribution of scores for each of the six decisiveness measures was
examined, and the upper and lower quartiles of each distribution were
used to generate "extreme groupings" for each of the dimensions of
decisiveness. All distributions met criteria for normalcy. Then,
using these extreme groups, a series of t-tests involving each of the
measures was done. We thus have a direct assessment of whether "high"
or "low" decisive subjects on a given dimension have better adjustment
scores.
Table 4 contains a complete summary of the entire series of com-
parisons. Only significant t-scores are shown in the table, along with
their significance levels, so even a quick overview of the table affords
the reader with a good sense of which decisiveness measures relate most
strongly to which adjustment measures. However, interpretation of these
data requires additional explanation.
As mentioned earlier, scoring for the decisiveness measures varies,
as does the scoring of the adjustment measures. In order to achieve
consistency in meaning across measures so that the reader can more
easily draw conclusions from the data, the following convention was
used. In every case, a high score means that the subject reports more
of whatever the construct name implies. Thus, for the adjustment
measures, a high score on Self-esteem means that the subject reports
high self-esteem, a high score on Depression means that the subject
reports greater depression, and so on. For the decisiveness measures
the same convention applies, but in some cases a high score on a
dimension corresponds to decisive behavior while in others it corresponds
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to indecisive behavior. Specifically, low Need For Information and
Tendency to Defer Decisions imply decisive behavior, while high Risk
Taking, Confidence in Decisions, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and
Peer Rating of Decisiveness imply decisive behavior. In Table 4 these
differences are reflected in the sign (direction) of the t-values. If
the t-value is positive
, this indicates that subjects who score high on
the particular decisiveness measure also tend to score high on the
adjustment measure. If the t-value is negative, subjects who score high
on the particular decisiveness measure tend to score low on the adjust-
ment measure. In order to aid the reader who wishes to bypass the
rather involved analysis required for interpreting each t-value, results
which are contrary to our major hypothesis are underscored in the table.
All other results are in the predicted direction.
Another point which needs clarification relates to the number of
subjects in each of the tests, which of course is important in determining
the significance levels. The number of subjects in a given t-test is a
function of the number of subjects falling into the two extreme groups,
missing data for a given subject, and so on. In fact, the sample size
ranged from 95 to 115, with approximately 50 subjects in each extreme
group. "One-tail" significance levels are reported, given that our
hypothesis includes a predicted direction for all results.
Finally, in the following analyses of these t-tests, each of the
decisiveness measures will be assumed to be just that — a measure of
an aspect of decisiveness. This is not to obscure the entire question
of validating these measures as aspects of decisiveness, but only to
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enable us to consider these results in terms of our theoretical formula-
tions. Thus, a low Need For Information subject is considered to be a
"high decisive" subject on the dimension of Need For Information, a low
Confidence in Decisions subject is taken to be a "low decisive" subject
on the dimension of Confidence in Decisions, and so on.
Having clarified some points related to interpretation of these
data, we return to an overview of Table 4. Perhaps the most striking
result is the large number of significant t-values observed with the
two impressionistic measures. Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer
Rating of Decisiveness. We have already noted that these measures most
strongly reflect a phenomenological approach to decisiveness, so this
observation is again stressed, and will be considered in detail in the
next chapter. It is also apparent, however, that each of the other
measures yield significant t-values. Let us therefore consider these
data in detail, looking separately at the significant results for each
of our decisiveness measures.
1) Need For Infonnatlon - Tliree significant differences were
observed with subjects grouped according to their NFI
scores, all in the predicted direction. Thus, we deduce
from Table 4 that low NFI (high decisive) subjects received
higher peer ratings of performance and higher verbal and
math SAT scores.
2) Confidence in Decisions - Again, we observe three significant
differences, all in the predicted direction. In this case,
high CID (high decisive) subjects report greater Self-esteem
and less Alienation and Anomie.
3) Risk Taking - Here we observe only two significant differences,
and one of them is contrary to prediction. As expected, high
RT (high decisive) subjects report less Anxiety on Exams,
but they also rate themselves lower on the four General Self
Appraisal questions (which deal with social and academic life)
.
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4) Tendency to Defer Decisions - The test validity of this measure
Is in question, of course, but putting this aside for a moment,
we observe six significant differences, with all but one in the
predicted direction. Thus, as expected, low TDD (high decisive)
subjects report greater Self-esteem, less Alienation, less
Anxiety on Exams, a higher GPA, and less Obsessiveness
, but
contrary to prediction, they also report a lower verbal SAT.
These results clearly require further discussion, including
the apparent contradictions entailed in scoring high on some
measures but low on others.
5) Self Appraisal of Decisiveness - The subject groupings on this
measure yielded twelve significant differences, all in the
predicted direction. Thus, high SAD (high decisive) subjects
reported a higher General Self Appraisal, greater Satisfaction
in Life, higher Self-esteem, less Alienation, Anomle, Depression,
Sadness, Resentment, Anxiety on Exams and Obsessiveness, and
higher Self Appraisal of Performance and Overall Adjustment.
Again, these results will be discussed further, especially the
possible contamination of these data due to methods variance
or response bias.
6) Peer Rating of Decisiveness - These data are almost identical
to the results observed in the case of Self Appraisal of Deci-
siveness, in that twelve significant differences were observed
in most of the same cases. The only exception is that a signi-
ficant difference was not observed in the case of Anxiety on
Exams, while one was observed for Peer Rating of Performance,
showing that subjects who were rated as decisive (high PRD) by
their peers were also rated higher on the performance questions.
An overall difference between the PRD and SAD data is that the
levels of significance are lower in the case of PRD, which again
suggests that the strong results observed for SAD may be at least
partially a function of methods variance.
Several general observations and questions emerge from these data.
We note that of 96 t-tests computed, 38 were significant. Thus, one
question which arises is whether the pattern of significant results
which were observed can be explained theoretically, and conversely,
whether we can also understand why results were not observed in some
cases. As suggested above, one factor which may account for this pattern
of relationships is methods variance, for the strongest relationships
are between the self-report decisiveness and adjustment measures.
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Because this factor is so important to the interpretation of all of the
results, it will be considered now, before making any further interpre-
tations of the data.
Methods Variance
Whenever a relationship between two measures is observed, one must
always attempt to determine whether the relationship is a function of
an actual relationship between the traits or constructs or whether the
relationship is an artifact of the procedures used to obtain the data.
In the case of self-report measures this methodological contamination of
the results is referred to as response bias, halo effect, or problems
of social desirability. Statistically, this is a problem of methods
variance, and it is especially important in the present investigation
because our major decisiveness measure and most of our adjustment
measures are purely self-report.
There are a number of statistical approaches to this rather dif-
ficult problem. An excellent discussion of this general problem as well
as the specific statistical procedure which will be used in the present
investigation is found in Campbell and Fiske (1959) . The procedure
outlined in that paper is a "multitrait-multimethod matrix" analysis,
which can be applied to questions of convergent and discriminant validity
of measures as well as to questions of methods variance.
Multitrait-multimethod analysis . To briefly summarize this pro-
cedure, we note that the basic task is to separate methodological con-
tamination from data which is based on relationships between a variety
of measures. Two types of validation of the measures are implicit in
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this procedure. Convergent validation requires that at least two
different, independent measures of the construct under consideration
agree with each other. Discriminant validation, aimed at demonstrating
that there is a valid distinction between the construct under considera-
tion and other constructs, requires more than one construct or trait
being measured by the same procedure.
In multitrait-multimethod analysis, both discriminant and con-
vergent validity are assessed in combination to validate the constructs
and particular measures as well as to estimate the degree of methods
variance which may be contaminating relationships between the measures.
The procedure employs a multitrait-multimethod correlation matrix, con-
taining correlations between two or more distinct traits which are
measured by at least two independent methods. Most of our data is not
subject to this type of analysis, for each of our decisiveness and
adjustment dimensions is not measured by two or more independent methods.
However, we can apply this procedure to some of our data, and fortunately,
the most important methods variance question falls into this category.
This question stems from the overwhelming "superiority" we observed in
our two impressionistic measures as they relate to adjustment, which
in the case of Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, could be explained by
response bias.
In order to investigate this, we note that we do have two distinct
traits (decisiveness and performance in academic and social life) which
are measured by two independent procedures, self-appraisal and peer
ratings. In multitrait-multimethod analysis a correlation matrix is
generated in which each correlation coefficient is classified into one
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of three major categories.^ First, there are the monotrait-heteromethod
coefficients (enclosed in rectangles in Table 5) , which relate to con-
vergent validity (independent measures of the same trait should correlate
with each other). If these values are low, the convergent validity of
the trait is in doubt. The second category contains the heterotrait-
monomethod coefficients (enclosed in circles in Table 5) , and the third
category contains the heterotrait-heteromethod coefficients (enclosed
in triangles in Table 5)
.
The relative magnitudes of coefficients within
one category as opposed to coefficients within the other categories
relate to various forms of discriminant validity. Thus, the monotrait-
heteromethod values should be higher than the heterotrait-monomethod and
the heterotrait-heteromethod values, which means that the correlation
between different measures of the same trait should be higher than
correlations between different measures of different traits and between
the same measure of a different trait. If one of these comparisons is
reversed, contamination due to methods variance is indicated, for one
concludes that correlations between methods of data collection are more
important than the correlations between the traits themselves.
Applying this procedure to our data (Table 5) , we see evidence for
convergent validity of the two traits, but there is also evidence for
contamination in the relationships between the traits due to methods
A fourth category which is a measure in reliability of the constructs
is the monotrait-monomethod category. This value is based on repeated
application of the same measure or application of the same measure to
a different sample. As these data are not available in the present
investigation, this category is not applicable here.
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TABLE 5
Muatitrait-multlaethod Correlation
Matrix for Self and Peer Ratings
Method A
(Self Appraisal)
Method B
(Peer Rating)
Self Appraisal Self Appraisal Peer Rating Peer Rating
of Decisiveness of Perforaance of Decisiveness of Performance
Self Appraisal
of Decisiveness
(Method a)
Self Appraisal
of Performance
1.00
1.00
.21**
.06 .22***
Peer Rating of
Decisiveness
(Method B)
Peer Rating of
Ferfomanoe
1.00 .43
1.00
Notes Monotrait-heteromethod coefficients are enclosed in
rectangles . Heterotrait-monomethod coefficients are
enclosed in circles. Heterotrait-heteromethod coef-
ficients are enclosed in triangles .
*** p< .001
** p< .01
* P< .05
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variance. Thus, the monotrait-heteromethod values (in rectangles) are
relatively high and significant beyond the .005 level, indicating agree-
ment between different measures of the same traits. Looking next at the
relative magnitude of the three categories of coefficients, we observe
that both monotrait-heteromethod values are higher than both heterotrait-
heteromethod values, which indicates that different measures of the same
traits correlate better with each other than do different measures of
different traits. However, the most important comparison, which speaks
directly to the question of methods variance, yields mixed results:
the monotrait-heteromethod values are only slightly larger than one
heterotrait-monomethod value, and smaller than the other. Specifically,
the correlation of .21 between the two independent measures of decisive-
ness and the correlation of .22 between the independent measures of per-
formance are slightly larger than the correlation (.17) between the self-
appraisals of decisiveness and performance, suggesting that methods
contamination is a major factor. That is, self-appraisals of different
traits (decisiveness and performance) correlate almost as highly as
different measures of each of these traits. One must note, however,
that this investigation is in fact claiming that decisiveness correlates
with performance. Therefore, some correlation between the same measure
of the two different traits is expected. This makes it very difficult
to estimate how much of the correlation between the two traits as
measured by self-appraisal is due to methods contamination and how much
is due to a true relationship between the traits. Some indication of
this is obtained in the peer rating data, in which this measure of the
two different traits yields a higher correlation (.43) than independent
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measures of each of the traits. This is certainly evidence for methods
variance, for one would expect that different measures of the same con-
struct would correlate better than the same measure of different traits,
even if a correlation between the traits is expected. Thus, while it is
still difficult to even estimate the actual magnitude of methods variance
in these data, we can say that a considerable amount of methods variance
contaminates the self-appraisal measures, and an even larger amount con-
taminates the peer rating measures.
The conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the two constructs
involved, global assessments of decisiveness and performance, meet
criteria for convergent validity, but not for discriminant validity,
and the relationship between the measures suffers due to methods
variance. Before making further interpretations based upon this con-
clusion, however, let us look at additional data from the perspective of
multitrait-multimethod analysis.
An overview of the adjustment and decisiveness measures shows no
other clear cases in which two distinct constructs are measured by two
or more independent procedures. However, if we look at individual items
on some of the measures, along with theoretical and methodological sim-
ilarities between certain constructs, such a case does emerge. Speci-
fically, two of the individual questions on the Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness instruments can be taken
to tap constructs which are similar to our constructs of Need For Infor-
mation and Confidence in Decisions. The first item is question 3 on
both of the impressionistic measures, asking how much time the subject
requires in making decisions. As discussed in the preceding chapter.
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this construct is closely related both theoretically and behaviorally to
need for information, and both of these constructs have been assessed
in previous research through the use of the Expanded Judgment Task
(Singer and Roby, 1967; Audley, 1964). If we accept this similarity
for the moment, we obtain three independent measures of this construct
(which we will call "Information Processing")
, including a behavioral
one, a subjective one, and a peer rating. In the same way, question 4
on the impressionistic measures taps the subject's confidence in
decisions, so we have the same three measures of this construct.
The multitrait-multimethod matrix which emerges from this data
reduction is presented in Table 6. Applying the same analyses as in the
preceding case, the following conclusions can be reached. First, the
convergent validity of the two constructs, as determined by the monotrait-
heteromethod coefficients (enclosed in rectangles) , is virtually non-
existent. As this is the most crucial requirement, there is no real pay-
off in proceeding with further analyses. We can see, however, that the
high correlation between the peer ratings of Need For Information and
Confidence in Decisions supports our earlier conclusion that there is
considerable methods variance contaminating the results of the peer
rating measures. It should also be noted that the poor convergent val-
idity here is not surprising or overly significant, given the fact that
single items were extracted from mult i-item measures and used to tap
constructs which they were not specifically designed to tap.
Returning now to the data in Table 4 which generated the general
issue of methods variance, we begin to see the significance of these
methodological considerations. Essentially, it is now possible to say
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that a considerable proportion of the variance accounted for by the Self
Appraisal and Peer Rating measures is attributable to the methods em-
ployed. Of course, this is really an indirect conclusion, for it is
not possible to perform a multitrait-multimethod analysis on all of the
adjustment measures under consideration. Yet, the strong relationship
between the self-report decisiveness and adjustment measures, coupled
with the above findings, supports this conclusion. In order to gain in-
sight into the contribution of methods variance in the relationships
between other adjustment measures and our decisiveness measures, an
additional statistical procedure, regression analysis, can be used.
Because of the importance of this issue to any further interpretation of
the data, v^e will present these data now, and then return to our look at
the t-test data and proceed to other results.
Regression analysis . One way to address the question of methods
variance is to determine the amount of variance accounted for in a
given adjustment measure by each of the decisiveness measures. This can
be done through regression analysis, a procedure which finds a linear
combination of independent variables (in our situation, the decisiveness
measures) which correlates as highly as possible with a given dependent
(adjustment) variable. From this "regression equation" one is able to
obtain information about how the various independent variables relate
to each other and to the dependent variable under consideration. The
statistics which supply this information are based on the addition of
A more complete description of these statistics if found in Nie,
Bent, and Hull (1970).
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variables, one at a time, to the regression equation. In Table 7, the
independent variables are listed in descending order of importance, with
the first variable accounting for more of the variance in the adjust-
ment measure than the second, the second more than the third, and so on.
The first statistic in the table is the Multiple R, which gives the
correlation between the dependent variable and the regression equation
up to and including the addition of the particular independent variable
under consideration. The next statistic is more important, the R^, which
can be interpreted as the proportion of variance in the dependent vari-
able which can be accounted for by the independent variables up to and
2including the one under consideration. The R Change statistic refers
to the additional variance accounted for by the addition of that parti-
cular variable to the regression equation. The Simple R is also important,
for it gives the simple correlation between the particular independent
variable and the dependent variable. The sign of this statistic or
course must be interpreted in light of scoring pecularities for the
measures involved, as was the case in the t-test data. Finally, the F
statistic measures the significance of the regression equation represent-
ing more than mere chance. Thus, it gives a sense of the overall utility
of the combination of independent variables going into the regression
equation, in terms of statistically "predicting" the value of the de-
pendent variable.
With this introduction, we can now look at the nine regression
analyses contained in Table 7 in terms of some of the questions raised
by the previous analyses. As was the case in the t-test data, we
observe that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness is clearly the "strongest"
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TABLE 7
Sumoary of Multiple Regression Data
1. Dependent Vai-lablet General Self Appraisal
VarialDlG Multiple R r! 2R Change Simple R F
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness .23 .05 .05 .23 2.9^*
Need For Information .25 .06 .01 -.10
Risk Taking .28 .08 .01 -.12
Tendency to Defer Decisions .30 .09 .01 -.0i^
Confidence in Decisions .30 .09 .00 .03
Peer Rating of Decisiveness .30 .09 .00 .08
2, Dependent Variable t Self Esteem
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Risk faking
3. Dependent Variable i Alienation
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Need For Information
4, Dependent Variable t Anonie
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Risk Taking
Confidence in Decisions
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Need For Information
Tendency to Defer Decisions
5. Dependent Variable t Depression
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness .32 .10 .10 -.32 ^.65»*
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Tendency to Defer Decisions
Need For Information
.39 .15 .15 .39 8.14»*
.40 .16 .01 -.10M .17 .01 -.14
AZ .18 .01 .15
.42 .18 .00 .04
.20 .04 .04 -.20 3.04*
.23 .05 .02 .14
.27 .07 .02 -.11
.29 .08 .01 -.13
.30 .09 .01 -.10
.30 .09 .00 .02
hh
.19 .19 -.44 7.79*.*
.20 .00 -.03
.20 .00 .07M .20 ,00 -.12
.20 .00 .01M .20 .00 .05
.34 .12 .01 -.16
.36 .13 .01 -.12
.36 .13 .00 -.08
.36 .13 .00 .01
.36 .13 .00 .03
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TABLE 7 - Continued
6, Dependent Variable t ReBonbment
7.
8.
Variable Multiple R rL 2R Chaiure
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness .27 .07 .07 -.27 2.53*
Peer Rating of Deciaiveneso .28 .08 .00 -.11
Need For Information .28 ,08 .00 .04
Tendency to Defer Decisions .28 .08 .00 .04
Risk Taking .28 .08 .00 -.04
Confidence in Decisions .26 .08 .00 .00
Dependent Variable t Obsessiveness
Self Appraioal of Decisiveness .42 .18 .18 - ,42 12,05»*
Peer Rating of Decisiveness .20 .02 - ,22
Tendency to Defer Decisions .21 . uu
94.sk Taking .21 .00 -.03
Dependent Variable! Anxiety on Examinations
Self AppicalsAl of Decisiveness .27 .07 .07 -.27 3.93>**
Risk Taking .32 .10 .03 -.15
Confidence in i^ooisions .33 .11 .01 -.07
Tendency to Defer Decisions .34 .11 .00 .12
Need For Information .34 .11 .00 .03
Peer Rating of Decisiveness .34 .11 .00 -.05
9. Dependent Variable! Overall Ad.justment
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
Peer Rating of Decisiveness
Confidence in Decisions
Risk Taking
Need For Information
Tendency to Defer Decisions
.50 .25 .25 .50
.52 .28 .03 ,26
.53 .28 .01 .09
.54 .29 .01 .03
.54 .29 .00 -.02
.54 .29 ,00 -.06
10.6-
Notes t Variables are listed in descending order of Importance.
Multiple R - correlation between dependent variable and all
independent variables added to the regression equation up
to that point.
R^ - This can be Interpreted as the proportion of variance in
"~
the dependent variable which can be accounted for by all
^
independent vai-lables up to that point.
R^ Change - The additional variance accounted for by
virtue or
the addition of this particular independent variable.
3iMple R - This is the simple correlation between the
particular
fedipendent variable and the dependent variable.
F - levS of significance of the entire regression
eqmtlon.
Variables which are omitted ftom a particular
analysis are stax
tically insignificant,
p <,001
P < .01
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measure. That Is. in every case it accounts for a greater proportion
of the variance in the dependent variable than any of the other de-
cisiveness measures. Thus, looking at the values for and Change,
we see that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts for most of the
variance, with the other measures adding little or nothing. The weight
of Self Appraisal of Decisiveness as opposed to the other measures is
also supported by the much higher Simple R observed for this measure in
each of the regressions. Finally, the F statistics indicate that the
probability of accounting for this amount of variance in the dependent
measures by "chance" is less than one in a hundred for all regressions.
Given the fact that Self Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts for
almost all of the variance in these self report adjustment measures, the
existence of considerable methods variance is again suggested. These
regression data can be used to tell us approximately how much methods
variance is involved by simply subtracting the actual variance accounted
for by Self Appraisal of Decisiveness from the total variance accounted
for by all of the adjustment measures. This operation results in a
determination of the variance attributable to the behavioral and peer
rating measures, which can be considered as true, non-methods variance
2because of the nature of these instruments. Thus, subtracting R for
2Self Appraisal of Decisiveness from the total R figure in each regression,
we observe the remaining non-methods variance to range from a low of 1%
for anomie and resentment to a high of 5% for alienation. Of course,
these figures are based on the assumption that all of the variance
accounted for by Self Appraisal of Decisiveness is attributable to methods
factors. However, considering the high degree of convergent validity and
66
the adequate discriminant validity shovm in Table 5 for the self-appraisals
of decisiveness and performance, it is reasonable to infer that Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness accounts for at least as much "true" variance
as the non-self-report measures. This suggests that 1 to 5 percent of
the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness variance is also non-contaminated.
Indeed, this figure is probably a bit higher in view of the fact signi-
ficant "true" correlations are theoretically expected between Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness and the other indices of decisiveness, so
some degree of "shared" correlation with the dependent variables is to
be expected. Also, the fact that the self and peer ratings of decisive-
ness relate to virtually the same adjustment measures suggests some "true"
relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and the adjustment
measures
.
Taking all of the methods variance data into consideration we can
conclude that methods variance is indeed responsible for much of the
relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and the self-report
adjustment measures, as well as the relationship between Peer Rating of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Performance. Our data are not sufficient
to arrive at an accurate determination of the amount of methods vari-
ance, but it seems reasonable to infer that at the very minimum 1 to 5
percent (and probably more) of the variance common to Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness and the dependent variables is "true" or valid. Of course,
the other behavioral measures of decisiveness and the peer rating are
not vulnerable to this problem, given their objective nature.
The significance of the above conclusion clearly requires further
discussion, especially in relation to interpreting the overall results
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presented in Table 4. Before proceeding with this discussion, however,
it would be useful to consider additional data which may also be vulner-
able to methods variance contamination. After this data is considered
we can more effectively integrate our results in a general discussion.
Additional Analyses
Careful judgments have to be made about additional analyses, for
the data analysis can become overwhelming with little additional payoff.
For example, we have been using the total score for the Tendency to Defer
Decisions instrument, despite evidence of poor test validity. One
option, therefore, is to consider each dimension of this instrument
separately as a unique factor, and perform the same tests we have just
presented all over again on these new factors. Indeed, one could extend
this argument further by factor analyzing all of the items which con-
stitute our decisiveness measures and generating a new set of "independent
measures" based on these factor loadings. While this may appear to be
going to an extreme, because of the particular questions raised by
previous analyses this procedure was used. In so doing, we can further
establish the validity of our measures, and, pertaining to the question
of methods variance, establish if the self-report measure of decisiveness
is truly distinct and independent of what we have been calling our be-
havioral and peer rating measures.
Factor analysis of all independent variables . These data are dif-
ficult to reproduce in their entirety because of the large number of
variables involved, but a summary of these data is contained in Table 8,
which gives the composition and "weight" of each of the major factors
and the correlations between these factors.
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TABLE 8
Summary of Factor Analysis of All Decisiveness Measures
Factor % Var. Cum. % Var Factor Loadings
I 15.6 15.6 Peer Rating of Decisiveness (items l,2,3,i|,7)
II 30.1 Need For Information (trials 1,2,3)
III 10.8 M.o Self Appraisal of Decisiveness (items 1,2,3.4)
IV 8.9 49.8 Self Appraisal of Decisiveness (items 5»6)
V 8.3 58.1 Confidence In Decisions (trials 1,2,3)
VI 7.9 66.0 Risk Taking (items 1,2,3,4,5,10,12)
VII 5.1 71.1 Peer Rating of Decisiveness (items 5f6)
VIII-XVI (5.0) 100.0 Risk Taking (items 6,8,ll) on Factor VIII,
no clear pattern on remaining factors.
Factor Pattern Correlations
Factors I II HI IV V VI VII VIII
I 1.00
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
.01 .12 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03
1.00 -.03 -.04 -.19 .14 .03 .14
1.00 .04 .11 .04 -.02 -.08
1.00 -.03 -.05 -.20 .12
1.00 -.09
1.00
-.02
.08
1.00
-.07
.10
-.02
1.00
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Recalling the composition of the various measures of decisiveness,
we note from Table 8 that all of the items from Peer Rating of Decisive-
ness load on Factor I, the three trials in Need For Information load on
Factor II, and all of the items contained in Self Appraisal of Decisive-
ness except for item 7 load on Factor III, and that these three factors
account for most of the important variance. Looking further, some addi-
tional useful information emerges. The next five factors, with each
accounting for five to nine percent of the variance, are made up of other
major independent measures as initially constituted, or parts thereof.
Thus, the "omitted items" from the Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and
Peer Rating of Decisiveness scales make up two factors (Factors IV and
VII)
,
Confidence in Decisions makes up Factor V, and most of the items
from Risk Taking represent Factors VI and VIII. Thus, we see that even
if we disregard the grouping of items according to the construction of
our measures, five of the six decisiveness measures do emerge as major
factors. The sixth. Tendency to Defer Decisions, is again seen to
present a problem, in that its items do not load on any major factors.
However, this analysis enables us to conclude that further analyses
based upon any minor factors which TDD does load on would probably not
yield strong results, for only a very small amount of variance could
possibly be accounted for.
There is additional information of interest in Table 8 in the form
of correlation patterns among the various major factors. The correla-
tion of .12 between Factor I (Peer Rating of Decisiveness) and Factor III
(Self Appraisal of Decisiveness) is expected given our earlier correla-
tional data. We might note here that this correlation between the peer
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rating and self-appraisal measures, coupled with our earlier finding
that both of these measures relate to many adjustment measures, supports
the view that the self-appraisal results are not completely attributable
to response bias. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
The relatively strong correlation between Factor II (Need For Informa-
tion) and Factor V (Confidence in Decisions) is also expected. Factor II
also correlates with Factors VI and VII, which represent the two major
parts of the Risk Taking instrument. Taken together, these data support
our earlier conclusion that there is a correlation between the various
behavioral, task-oriented instruments, but that there is not a correla-
tion between the behavioral and impressionistic instruments. This
point should also be noted because it supports the methodological dis-
tinction between the task-oriented and impressionistic measures, a dis-
tinction which is central to our interpretation of methods variance.
An unexpected finding which emerges in this table is the correlation
between Factors IV and VII, which include the two omitted items from
both of the seven-item self-appraisal and peer rating decisiveness
measures. These items ask whether "big" or "small" decisions are more
difficult. The fact that they correlate with each other again suggests
some objective (peer rating) validation of the self-appraisal measure, and
the fact that they emerge as factors which account for a significant
portion of the total variance (14%) suggests that additional analyses
using these four items may be fruitful.
Looking at these four items, a series of correlation coefficients
pairing each of them with the major adjustment measures was obtained.
The following significant results were observed:
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1) Question 5 from Self Appraisal of Decisiveness correlated with
four adjustment measures, Including Self-esteem (p <. .01),
Alienation (p < .01), Anomle (p <.005), and Depression (p < .05).All correlations Indicated that subjects who had more difficulty
with small decisions did not do as well on the adjustment measures,
reporting less Self-esteem and more Alienation, Anomle, and
Depression.
2) Question 6 from Self Appraisal of Decisiveness also correlated
significantly with four measures, Obsessiveness (p < .005),
Math SAT (p< .01), Anomle (p < .05) and Anxiety on Exams
(p < .001). Subjects who reported that big decisions are more
difficult than small ones had lower Math SAT scores and higher
Obsessiveness, Anomle, and Anxiety scores.
3) Question 5 from Peer Rating of Decisiveness correlated with
five adjustment measures as follows: subjects who were judged
to have more difficulty with small decisions than big ones
reported lower Self-esteem (p < .05), more Anomle (p < .005),
Depression (p < .05) and Resentment (p < .05), and also were
given lower ratings by their peers on the five "general per-
formance" in social and academic life questions (p < .01).
4) Question 6 from Peer Rating of Decisiveness (asking if the
subject has more difficulty with big decisions than small ones)
did not correlate with any of the major adjustment scores.
These results will be discussed in the next chapter, but we again note
that response bias must be considered as a factor in the two self-report
questions.
At the same time that these separate analyses for the omitted items
from the self-appraisal and peer rating decisiveness measures were per-
formed, we also looked at the Risk Taking instrument from the perspective
of its separate factors. We could have partitioned this scale in several
different ways, basing the partition either on the factor analysis done
earlier just for that scale, or on the larger factor analysis done on all
of the decisiveness items. It was decided to fucus on the latter, for
the factor loadings were more clear-cut and the fact that they were
generated from a much larger pool of variables suggests that these
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factors may represent a more realistic grouping of items. Thus, we see
from Table 8 that items 1. 2, 3. 4. 5, 10. and 12 all fall on one factor
(which we can call RTl) and items 6, 8, and 11 fall on another major
factor (RT2)
.
Tlie correlation coefficients relating each of these
factors to our major adjustment measures yielded the following results:
1) RTl correlated with only one major adjustment measure. Aliena-
tion (p < .05), with high RTl (high decisive) subjects report-
ing less alienation.
2) RT2 correlated with only one major adjustment measure. Depression
(p < .05), with high RT2 (high decisive) subjects reporting
more depression (contrary to prediction)
.
3) RTl correlated fairly well with RT2 (r- .32, p < .001), and
both RTl and RT2 correlated very strongly with the original
RT total scale (r=.87 and .67, respectively, p< .001).
Thus, it is not surprising that factor analyzing this measure
did not produce significantly more results.
On the basis of these data we may conclude that our original decision
to use the total Risk Taking instrument was valid.
These analyses conclude the survey of the relationship between in-
dividual decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures. There is
another approach which may shed light on these relationships, namely the
addition of the "control" variables of sex, religion, class, and college
major.
Relation of the decisiveness and adjustment measures to the control
variables . In order to assess whether such an approach would be useful,
a number of simple correlation coefficients were obtained, relating each
of these control variables to each of the major decisiveness and adjust-
ment measures. These rather extensive data will not be reproduced here,
for in themselves they do not tell us a great deal. However, we can say
that each of the control variables was observed to correlate significantly
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with at least a few of the major adjustment and decisiveness measures,
indicating that there may be some interaction between the control vari-
ables and the decisiveness measures as they relate to the adjustment
measures
.
On the other hand, we must also realize that the "simple" relation-
ships which were observed without regard to the control variables were
not particularly strong, so there is no way to predict whether much will
be gained by performing a series of multi-factored analyses of variance
to test for these interactions. Thus, the only real way to determine
the effect of the control variables is to actually run the tests.
It is impractical to reproduce the entire series, for we have six
decisiveness measures which can interact with as many as fifteen adjust-
ment measures and four control variables, for a total of 360 separate
analyses of variance. Another important consideration to keep in mind
in selecting which analyses to present is the actual number of significant
analyses observed for a given control variable. With the large number
of analyses involved, we would expect a certain number of significant
results to occur just by chance. Thus, we will adopt the minimum criterion
for significance used throughout this paper (which of course works in the
"reverse" in this instance) and ignore anything less than a figure of 5%
significant Interactions for a given control variable. With 90 analyses
for each control variable (6 decisiveness measures X 15 adjustment
measures) , this translates into a needed minimum of four or five signi-
ficant interactions. As it turned out, the only control variable which
yielded four or more significant Interactions with the decisiveness
measures was Sex. In the other cases, less than this number were observed.
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so we see these data do not meet our criterion for significance, and
therefore will not be presented.
The design which was used for the analyses involving Sex and the
decisiveness measures was a 2x2 factorial analysis, with one of the
decisiveness measures (extreme groupings were used) as one factor, and
Sex as the second factor. A different adjustment measure served as the
dependent variable for each analysis. Nine significant interactions were
observed, so we can easily summarize these data, looking individually
at significant interactions for each of the decisiveness measures. We
will ignore significant "main effects," for these were dealt with in our
t-test data.
1) Need For Information and Sex interacted significantly (p < .05)
in two instances, Anomie and General Self Appraisal, with
decisive males and indecisive females reporting greater Anomie,
and decisive females and indecisive males reporting higher
General Self Appraisal. Thus, it appears that decisive fe-
males report better adjustment on these measures than decisive
males, and indecisive males report better adjustment than
indecisive females.
2) Confidence in Decisions and Sex interacted significantly
(p < .05) in the case of Peer Rating of Performance, with high
decisive males receiving higher ratings than high decisive
females, and low decisive females receiving better ratings than
low decisive males. Thus, in this case indecisive females and
decisive males perform better than their opposite-sex counter-
parts.
3) Risk Taking and Sex interacted in the case of General Self
Appraisal (p < .05), with high decisive females reporting a
better self appraisal than high decisive males, and no signi-
ficant difference between males and females in the low
decisive category.
4) Tendency to Defer Decision and Sex interacted significantly
(p < .05) in the case of General Self Appraisal, with the
same results reported for Risk Taking above.
5) Self Appraisal of Decisiveness did not interact with Sex.
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6) Peer Rating of Decisiveness and Sex interacted at the samelevel of significance (p < .05) on four adjustment measures:
Obsessiveness, Anxiety on Exams. Resentment, and Peer Rating
^T""^- ^^"^ ^^^^^ instances, females in thehigh decisive group did "better" (i.e., less obsessiveness.
less anxious, less resentment) than the males, while in thelow decisive group males did better than females. In the
case of Peer Rating of Performance, the opposite was true,
with high decisive males receiving better peer ratings than
females, and low decisive females receiving better ratings
than low decisive males.
While we have been postponing a general discussion of results
until the next chapter, the complexity of these data makes it advisable
to mention two general observations at this point. First, unlike much
of the preceding data, the above results are not vulnerable to the con-
tamination of methods variance, for only the objective measures of
decisiveness are involved. Second, a careful look at the above results
reveals that in every case in which an adjustment measure was based on
a self appraisal, high decisive females rated themselves "better" than
low decisive females, and low decisive males rated themselves "better"
than high decisive males. On the other hand, in those instances where
the dependent measure was based on peer ratings of the subjects, males
who are "high decisive" were rated better than females, and females who
are "low decisive" were rated better than males. The theoretical and
"socio-political" implications of this unexpected finding will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
Relationship between decisiveness and other adjustment measures .
Thus far we have been restricting our data analysis to what we have
been calling th6 "major" adjustment measures, meaning those self-
report and behavioral measures which tap the subjects' general psycho-
logical adjustment and ability to function academically and interpersonally
,
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In addition to these data we also have information on other areas which
relate to adjustment, but which must be handled by different statistical
procedures. These measures all take the form of "yes-no" responses to
specific questions, and thus cannot be handled by t-tests or analyses
of variance. Instead, a series of 2x2 tables was generated, dividing
subjects into four categories according to both their decisiveness score
on a particular measure and their response on one of these adjustment
questions. The Chi Square statistic indicates if there are significant
differences in the numbers of subjects falling into each category. The
specific questions involved in these analyses are whether the subject
uses drugs to cope with stress, whether he complains of physical symptoms
associated with stress, whether he participates in extracurricular and
athletic activities, and whether he plans to seek, or has already sought,
psychological guidance.
Of the 24 analyses in this series, three significant relationships
were observed (12%, an acceptable figure), but as in the preceding results
involving self-report measures, much of these relationships may be
attributable to response bias. It was found that fewer subjects who
scored high in Confidence in Decisions reported physical symptoms
(p <.01). Similarly, fewer subjects falling into the high decisive
group on Self Appraisal of Decisiveness reported physical symptoms
(p < .01) and interest in seeking psychological guidance (p < .01).
These data are all in the predicted direction.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
As mentioned in the Introduction, this investigation is not con-
cerned with the question of whether indecisiveness "causes" maladjust-
ment, or conversely with the question of whether being decisive is a
prerequisite to psychological health. Rather, it is concerned with a
phenomenological or experiential relationship between decisiveness and
adjustment, stemming from the theoretical link between the feeling of
being competent and the feeling of being able to make decisions. Thus,
our hypothesis is descriptive or correlational, not causal.
What, then, can we say about the nature of decisiveness and its
relationship to psychological adjustment? As in the case of our presen-
tation of results, we must approach this question in a systematic way,
for there is a great deal of data which must be integrated and inter-
preted. Therefore, we will follow the same logical outline employed
earlier, beginning with a look at decisiveness itself, and then moving
on to a look at its relationship to psychological adjustment.
The Nature of Decisiveness
The following discussion of decisiveness, quite obviously, is
based on a very limited number of measures which are designed to tap
specific aspects of the decision-making process. One can thus legiti-
mately wonder if our data justify making any statements at all about
"decisiveness" per se. Indeed, a conservative approach would be to
make no statements about decisiveness, but only about "need for
infor-
mation as measured by the Expanded Judgment Task," "risk taking
behavior
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as measured by the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire," and so on. In a
strict sense, of course, this conservative approach is the only truly
defensible one, for one can never be "sure" that a particular instrument
taps what (and only what) it is designed to tap. For the purposes of
this investigation, however, it is both useful and justifiable to adopt
a less conservative approach, for the following reasons.
First, and most importantly, this investigation has defined
"decisiveness" according to a number of operational and phenomenological
dimensions, so any statement we make about decisiveness is implicitly
contingent on our definition of decisiveness. Ultimately, then, it is
the definition itself which must be defended, rather than the indirect
relationship between our instruments and the construct of decisiveness.
The defense for our definition of decisiveness is contained in the
theoretical discussion and the supporting empirical research cited in
the Introduction. The crucial point, however, is that this investigation
is not primarily concerned with validating our definition of decisiveness,
but rather with examining the relationship between decisiveness as we
define it and psychological adjustment. Whether or not our definition
of decisiveness is a good one is reflected In the nature of the results
obtained on the basis of that definition.
The above rationale is contingent on each of our measures actually
tapping the specific dimension it is designed to tap. That is, we have
argued that our six dimensions can be considered as aspects of decisive-
ness because we have defined decisiveness according to these dimensions,
but it is important to consider if our measures actually tap these
dimensions. There are several ways to address this matter. Perhaps
the
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strongest point is that the face validity of each of our instruments is
extremely high. For example, in Need For Information, the measure con-
sists of a direct assessment of the amount of information required in
an actual decision-making task. The same operational validity is true
of the other behavioral measures. The two impressionistic measures have
equally high face validity, for the two constructs are defined in terms
of impressionistic assessments.
In addition to the high face validity of the measures, the test
and construct validity of the measures can be addressed by our data
analysis. This, of course, is precisely the purpose of this section
of the chapter, for by examining the validity and interrelationship
of our decisiveness measures we hope to learn something about the
nature of decisiveness as defined in this research.
We observed good test validity for five of the six decisiveness
measures, which suggests that each is tapping a homogeneous variable.
These measures include Need For Information, Confidence in Decisions,
Risk Taking, Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, and Peer Rating of Decisive-
ness. The sixth measure. Tendency to Defer Decisions, appears to be
multidimensional. Further, the significant (but relatively low) correla-
tions between the four task-oriented measures suggest that the dimen-
sions of decisiveness they tap are related to each other. However, the
relationships are not strong enough to indicate a monolithic trait of
decisiveness. Rather, our data suggest that decisiveness itself is a
multidimensional construct. This conclusion is supported by the ob-
servation that the two impressionistic measures correlate with each
other, but not with the behavioral measures. In addition, the fact that
most of the measures emerged virtually intact after a comprehensive
factor analysis as distinct factors indicates the multidimensionality
of decisiveness as reflected in our measures.
It is difficult to specify the nature of the various dimensions
of decisiveness in a general way, for each of our measures is quite
specific. However, the pattern of relationships among the decisiveness
measures sheds light on this matter. As noted in Chapter II, our
decisiveness measures can be categorized in two ways. First, they can
be classified according to the format for data collection. Thus, we
have four task-oriented, behavioral instruments, and two global, im-
pressionistic instruments. Secondly, they can be classified according
to their degree of objectivity. In this case, the four behavioral
measures are objective in that they are based on performance in a
decision-making situation rather than on the self-appraisal of the
subject, and the peer rating measure is objective in that someone other
than the subject is responding. Now, given these two classifications
and the pattern of relationships described above, the following con-
clusions can be made: (1), decision-making behavior of various sorts
is relatively homogeneous in that specific behaviors (amount of infor-
mation demanded, risk taking, and so on) correlate with each other;
(2), an impressionistic or subjective assessment of one's own decision-
making ability does not necessarily correlate with one's actual per-
formance in decision-making situations, and (3), one's self-appraisal
of his decision-making ability does tend to agree with the assessment
of an observer. However, each of these points must be qualified,
for
the observed correlations are fairly low, even when significant.
Thus
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the picture of decisiveness which emerges from these data is not one of
a circumscribed, homogeneous trait, but of a rather diffuse, hetero-
geneous construct in which some correlation between its various com-
ponents exists.
After confirming the test validity of the various measures of
psychological adjustment, a systematic analysis of the relationship
between the decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures was done,
from which we can now draw some conclusions.
The Relationship of Decisiveness to Psychological Adjustment
A preliminary series of t-tests using extreme groupings (upper and
lower quartiles) for each of the decisiveness measures afforded a picture
of how each of the decisiveness measures related to each of the adjust-
ment measures. The two Impressionistic measures. Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness, were observed to yield
more significant t-scores than any of the other measures. This suggests
either the actual "superiority" of an impressionistic assessment of
decisiveness in terms of its relationship to psychological adjustment,
or methods contamination in the self-report measures of decisiveness
and adjustment. Of course, a third possibility is that our data contain
both methods and non-methods variance. In fact, it will now be demon-
strated that this third alternative embodies the most realistic interpre-
tation of our data.
The purely statistical evidence contained in the multitrait-
multlmethod analyses and in the regression analyses suggest that a
significant portion of the relationship between the self-report decisive-
ness and adjustment measures is attributable to methods variance or
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response bias. This evidence is based on the observation that the
correlations between the same measure of different traits are approx-
imately equal to or in some cases higher than the correlations between
different measures of the same trait . The implication here is that
how a trait is measured is more important than what the trait is.
This large amount of response bias is not surprising in view of what
is known about individual differences in styles of self-presentation.
However, while it is difficult to specify precisely how much variance
is attributable to response bias, we can be certain that it is not all
response bias. That is, by comparison to other results that cannot be
distorted by response bias, we conclude that the relation between self-
appraised decisiveness and various adjustment measures is low but surely
significant. For example, five of our decisiveness measures are ob-
jective either because they are based on specific tasks or because of
the source of the data. Thus, any relationship between one of these
measures and the self-report adjustment measures is not vulnerable to
contamination due to response bias. Now, the correlation between Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisiveness suggests that
the global, impressionistic dimension of decisiveness which they tap
has some construct validity. In addition, the fact that both of these
measures relate to virtually the same adjustment measures suggests that
the self-appraisals cannot be completely a function of methods
factors
or response bias. In fact, it would be reasonable to infer that
Self
Appraisal of Decisiveness relates at least as strongly to adjustment
as does Peer Rating of Decisiveness. If this is the case,
then we
deduce that the strength of the true relationship between
Self Appraisal
83
of Decisiveness and the adjustment measures, excluding methods variance,
is at least as strong as the relationship between Peer Rating of Decisive-
ness and adjustment.
Taken together, then, our data support the view that the results
involving Self Appraisal of Decisiveness, which appear at first to be
the strongest results, are actually partially a function of extraneous
methods factors. A final point concerns the significance of this con-
clusion for the present investigation. While many studies would be
quite seriously challenged by evidence for so much methods variance,
the nature of this investigation is such that the impact is lessened.
This stems from our theoretical emphasis on the phenomenological rela-
tionship between decisiveness and adjustment, as opposed to a causal
one. Thus, it is not being claimed that decisiveness is a specific
trait which "causes" the development of other traits which indicate
psychological adjustment. Rather, the experiential or subjective com-
ponents of decisiveness and adjustment are considered to be closely
related to each other. In terms of our data this means that even if
the relationship between Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and adjustment
is due entirely to response bias, our theoretical link between the two
receives some support.
Apart from the fact that the two impressionistic measures of
decisiveness relate to far more adjustment measures than the behavioral
instruments, other patterns emerge from the data in Table 4. For
example. Need For Information, which is based on an actual decision-
making task, relates to only three measures of performance, and each of
these measures is a behavioral measure (Verbal SAT, Math SAT, and Peer
Rating of Performance). This is not to suggest the possibility of
methods contamination, for the two SAT measures are quite different
from the Expanded Judgment Task and the Peer Rating is inherently ob-
jective. Rather, this pattern seems to suggest that the behavioral
components of decisiveness relate mostly to behavioral constructs.
Similarly, we observe that Confidence in Decisions ~ a subjective
appraisal of one's performance on an objective task ~ correlates most
strongly with Self-esteem, Alienation, and Anomie. This makes sense
in that one would expect a person who is confident in himself to think
"better" of himself and also to feel either less dependent on others
(and hence less subject to feeling alienated) or less dependent on norms
to guide his behavior (hence, less anomie). It does not necessarily
follow that high confidence would relate in the same way to the other
adjustment measures, although it must be admitted that we would have
expected it to do so from our theoretical emphasis on the importance
of one's feeling that he can take effective action. Thus, our data
suggest that the relationship between confidence in one's decisions and
adjustment is much more specific to particular aspects of adjustment
than we had expected.
Risk Taking related significantly to Anxiety on Exams and the four
"General Self Appraisal" items which tap the subject's impression of
how well he thinks he is doing in academic and social life. In the
case of Anxiety on Exams, high risk taking subjects reported lower
anxiety. This may be understood in the context of the link between
risk taking and perceived ability described in Jellison and Rlsklnd
(1970) and which is also considered in the Introduction. Persons who
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perceive themselves as having high ability choose to take risks to
demonstrate this ability, and taking an examination is such a "risk."
In terms of decisiveness, this translates into the individual's per-
ception that he is capable of making decisions, so he is more comfortable
in a situation in which he can demonstrate this ability. In the case
of General Self Appraisal, however, results indicate that high risk
(high decisive) subjects report lower self-appraisals. This is not
consistent with the view that risk taking corresponds to perceived
ability. One possible explanation for this is that high risk individuals
might be willing to assxime risks because they are not as committed to
success as individuals who demand great certainty. Thus, if high risk
individuals are not committed to success, it follows that they would not
be as motivated to have a high self appraisal. Of course, this is all
post hoc speculation, and all that we are really justified in saying is
that our results with the Risk Taking dimension are disappointing and
conflicting.
Finally, the results observed for Tendency to Defer Decisions in
Table 4 cluster around adjustment and performance measures which intui-
tively relate to accepting responsibility for decisions and one's actions
in general: self-esteem, alienation, taking examinations, academic
performance, and obsessiveness. A person who chooses to make his own
decisions is likely to think highly of himself, not require a great
deal of social support, accept responsibility for academic work and
examinations, and not be obsessive about decisions. The fact that low
Tendency to Defer subjects report lower Verbal SAT scores is difficult
to understand, as is the fact that these same subjects report higher
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Grade Point Averages and less Anxiety on Exams. Given the consistency
of the other results observed for this measure, it is probable that the
relationship with Verbal SAT is spurious or contaminated by the very
rough averaging procedure which was used in the coding of these data
(scores were rounded to the nearest "hundred" for both Verbal and Math
SAT).
The above interpretations of the t-test data lead to two important
observations. First, virtually all of the significant results which
were observed are in the predicted direction — decisive individuals
are better adjusted and perform better in a variety of situations.
Second, the relationship between decisiveness and adjustment is much
less general than expected, with particular dimensions of decisiveness
relating only to particular dimensions of adjustment which are similar
to each other in terms of the type of behavior they tap. Thus, the
impressionistic measures of decisiveness tend to relate to subjective
components of adjustment (self-esteem, depression, resentment, and so
on) , the behavioral measures of decisiveness tend to relate to actual
performance variables, confidence in one's decisions relates to dimensions
which tap one's sense of self worth and independence, and so on. A more
general observation is that the impressionistic measures of decisive-
ness relate to more components of adjustment than any of the other
measures, which lends support to our theoretical emphasis on the phenom-
enological approach to decisiveness. Of course, all of these points take
into account the fact that the strength of the relationships involving
the self-appraisal instruments is diminished due to methods variance.
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In addition to these conclusions based upon the t-test data, other
analyses yield useful information. It was found that the items omitted
from the total Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and Peer Rating of Decisive-
ness scales (asking whether big or small decisions are more difficult)
emerged as significant measures of decisiveness in our factor analysis
of all measures, accounting for 14% of the variance. Looking at the
relationship between these items and the various adjustment and per-
formance measures, it was found that those subjects who reported that
small decisions were more difficult also reported less self-esteem and
greater alienation, anomie, and depression. Subjects who reported that
big decisions were more difficult reported lower Math SAT scores and
higher obsessiveness, anomie, and anxiety on examinations. Thus, with
the exception of anomie (which relates to both items)
,
feeling that
small decisions are more difficult seems to relate to how one sees
oneself (self-esteem, depression, alienation), while feeling that big
decisions are more difficult seems to relate to confident performance
(Math SAT, obsessiveness, anxiety on examinations). In the case of
anomie, one may speculate that decision-making difficulty of either sort
relates to feeling a lack of norms to guide behavior. We might there-
fore summarize these data by saying that the person who cannot make big
decisions is less able to function effectively, the person who cannot
make small decisions takes it out on himself, and problems with decisions
of either sort generate a feeling that one has no guidelines upon which
to base one's behavior. We also see support here for our observation
that particular aspects of decisiveness relate to particular aspects of
adjustment.
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The remaining data stemming from the factor analysis of all deci-
siveness measures concerns the two dominant factors of the Risk Taking
instrument and the test validity of the Tendency to Defer Decisions
instrument. Little was gained from an analysis of the relationship
between the two Risk Taking factors and the adjustment measures, which
is understandable given the high correlations between these factors and
between each factor and the total Risk Taking instrument. Thus, the test
validity of the original Risk Taking measure is supported. The results
for the Tendency to Defer Decisions instrument, however, were quite
different, for the items on this measure did not emerge as significant
factors in accounting for the variance in all of the decision-making
items. Further, the factor analysis of this scale alone yielded five
distinct factors with each accounting for a relatively large proportion
of the variance. Thus, this measure is both multidimensional and rather
weak as an indicator of decisiveness. Yet, in using the total ten-item
scale, several significant relationships with the adjustment measures were
observed, and these relationships were shown (in the above discussion) to
make intuitive and theoretical sense. We may therefore speculate that,
while there are serious problems with the particular version of the
scale used in this research, it still makes sense to consider "tendency
to defer decisions" as an aspect of decisiveness. Clearly, further
research using this dimension is in order, particularly in terms of
generating additional versions of the scale using a greater number of
items from which content-specific aspects of "tendency to defer decisions"
can be derived.
Looking next at the effect of the control variables on the
relationship between the decisiveness and adjustment measures, we
observed sex was the only factor which interacted with decisiveness.
When an observed significant interaction was based on an adjustment
variable involving a self-appraisal, high decisive females rated them-
selves "better" than low decisive females, while low decisive males
rated themselves better than high decisive males. Conversely, in the
case of peer ratings of the subjects, high decisive males were rated
better than low decisive males and low decisive females were rated
better than high decisive females. Given these data, one can derive
interesting theoretical and socio-political implications. Decisiveness
in males is a valuable trait from the perspective of others, and in-
decisiveness in females is similarly "valued." On the other hand, this
"external value system" is not congruent with one's "internal value
system," for indecisive males rate themselves better than decisive
males, and decisive females rate themselves better than indecisive
females. This, of course, is ignoring the observation that when sex
is not taken into consideration, decisiveness tends to relate to
better adjustment by both the subjects themselves and by peers. However,
on the basis of these data we may speculate that a "compensation effect"
is operating, in which an individual will tend to value in himself a
trait which he has, even though the opposite trait is valued by others,
thereby (perhaps) counteracting the fact that one does not conform to
expectations. The data for the females are particularly interesting
from this perspective given the present day "women's movement."
The only additional analyses yet to be discussed involve those
adjustment measures which are based on "yes-no" responses to specific
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questions. As we saw, the results observed were all in the predicted
direction, with fewer subjects who were high in Confidence in Decisions
reporting physical symptoms associated with stress, and fewer subjects
falling into the high decisive group on Self Appraisal of Decisiveness
reporting physical symptoms and interest in seeking psychological
guidance. As was noted in our presentation of these data, these results
can be attributed to response bias. However, our earlier discussion of
methods variance suggests that some true relationship may be contained
in all of the relationships between the self-report measures, especially
given the theoretical correlation between the dimensions these measures
tap. Also, even if these results are completely due to response bias,
we still can conclude that persons who claim to be decisive in terms
of the particular measures under consideration also claim fewer physical
symptoms and less need for psychological guidance. Thus, whether or
not one's actual decision-making ability relates to adjustment, we see
that an individual's perception of his decision-making ability relates
to his perception of his psychological adjustment.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental theoretical position of this research can be
fonnulated quite simply, and all of our findings relate directly to
this theoretical position. Stated most concisely, a person copes with
the normal stresses of life to the extent that he feels himself capable
of taking effective action to deal with the particular stress. Four
areas of psychological theory were presented in support of this posi-
tion, and this research attempts to integrate these positions and take
them a step further. This theoretical step was taken by postulating
that the ability to make decisions is the most important observable
manifestation of the ability to take action. Thus, a theoretical link
between decisiveness and psychological adjustment was postulated.
In order to investigate decisiveness, the literature on decision-
making was examined and the major components of decisiveness were
defined. A number of instruments designed to tap these dimensions of
decisiveness were administered to a large number of undergraduate
students, along with some measures of psychological adjustment and
performance in school and other areas of daily life. The major hypothesis
which guided this investigation was that decisive individuals show
better psychological adjustment and a higher level of performance than
indecisive ones. A phenomenological or experiential approach is implicit
in this hypothesis, in that the relationship between decisiveness and
adjustment was considered in correlational, rather than causal, terms.
Thus, the experience of decisiveness is closely related to psychological
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adjustment in a functional way. Also implicit in this hypothesis is the
premise that the various dimensions of decisiveness correlate with each
other.
The results showed good test validity for five of our six decisive-
ness measures, but relatively few significant relationships between the
decisiveness measures and the adjustment measures. Further, it was seen
that a large amount of response bias or methods variance contaminated
the relationship between our most powerful measure, Self Appraisal of
Decisiveness, and the adjustment measures. However, it was shown that
response bias could not explain all of the strong correlation between
Self Appraisal of Decisiveness and adjustment, and the hypothesized
relation between the two was confirmed. This Inference was based largely
on the observed correlation between the self-appraisal and peer ratings
of decisiveness, and the observation that these two measures related
to the adjustment measures in very similar ways. Hence, while response
bias attenuates the results for Self Appraisal of Decisiveness to some
extent, the validity of the hypothesized relation between decisiveness
and adjustment cannot be denied.
The patterns of significant relationships which were observed
suggest that decisiveness is a multidimensional trait, with the various
dimensions bearing some relationship to each other, and that the rela-
tionship between decisiveness and adjustment is not a general one, but
rather a function of the particular dimension under consideration.
Thus, the impressionistic measures of decisiveness tend to relate to
subjective components of adjustment, the behavioral measures of decisive-
ness tend to relate to actual performance variables, confidence in one's
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decisions relates to dimensions which tap one's sense of self worth and
Independence, and so on. Finally, the fact that the two Impressionistic
measures were related to more adjustment measures than any other measure
of decisiveness supports our theoretical position that a phenomenologlcal
or experiential relationship between decisiveness and adjustment Is
stronger than a behavioral or empirical one.
While this Investigation does shed light on the nature of decisive-
ness and Its relationship to psychological adjustment, many questions
remain which merit further research. In terms of this particular study,
the most Important question concerns the fact that our data were In-
sufficient to make an accurate determination of the extent to which
methods factors are responsible for our results In some crucial areas.
Further research could address this question by developing a method-
ology In which every dimension of decisiveness Is measured by at least
two independent methods. In a more general sense, one must note that
our conclusions are based on a number of specific laboratory measures
which were administered to a relatively homogeneous group of students
who were motivated to participate by receiving course credits. Further
research using more realistic decision-making situations and a more
heterogeneous population would certainly broaden our understanding of the
relationship between decisiveness and psychological adjustment. Perhaps
the most important conclusion which emerges from the present investigation
is that such a comprehensive study is justified, for while our specific
conclusions are limited by methodological factors, the existence of a
relationship between decisiveness and adjustment is supported.
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APPENDIX
The questionnaires on the following pages are identical to those usedin this research, except for the addition of marginal labels to aid
the reader in the identification of specific scales and measures.
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Directions for Decision-Making Test
This is a test of decision-making ability. Please write your name in the
space provided on the answer sheet. The results of this test will be strictly
confidential, and used for experimental purposes only.
In front of you are three decks of cards, each deck containing 50 cards.
Each deck definitely contains circles, and may have in addition a certain number
pf ssuares. These are the only kinds of cards which the deck may have. The deck
is wall shuffled and the cards are not placed in any kind of order. You will
hcvi to decide how many circles there are in the entire deck. There can be
either 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, or 50 circles in the deck. One of
these
ten possibilities is the correct answer. You will flip through the deck one
ctrd at a time. You will be allowed only a single decision . It is up to you to
decide when the best time to make your, decision has been reached. You can make
ycur decision at any point as you flip through the cards. Your performance will
be evaluated by a scoring system. You will receive more points for a correct
decision if you make it earlier in the series. In other words, the sooner you
make your decision, the more points you will receive if it is correct. However,
you will receive zero points if the decision you make is Incorrect. Obviously,
the
more cards you look at the better chance you will have to make the correct
de-
cision. On the other hand, the longer you delay your decision the lower
the
number of points you will receive for a correct decision. It is important that
you try to score as many points as possible.
There Is a second part of the experiment. Before each card is
presented
to you. you should check the appropriate position of the 10 point
confidence
scale. This should represent your confidence m the correctness of your decision
if you had to make it before the next card Is shown to you.
Be sure to check
all fifty of these scales at the appropriate time. Remember, you
are allowed only
a single decision . When you feel that the best time to make your
decision has
arrived write your decision next to the confidence .cale for the
coming trial.
For example, if you wish to make your decision after the 25th
card is shown
to you, luce your answer next to the 26th scale. Feel free to ask any
question
you may have about these instructions.
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Name
Male Female
DECISION-MAKING TEST
Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 3
1 123456789 10 1 123456789 10 • 1 123456709 10
2 123456789 10 2 123456789 10 2 123456789 10
3 123456789 10 3 123456709 10 3 123456709 10
4 123456789 10 4 123456789 10 4 123456739 10
5 123456789 10 5 123456789 10 5 123456739 10
6 123456789 10 6 123456789 10 6 123456789 10
7 123456789 10 7 12 3456789 10 7 123456709 10
8 123456789 10 8 123456789 10 8 12 3456709 10
9 123456789 10 c 123456789 10 9 123456709 10
10 123456789 10 10 123456789 10 10 123456709 10
11. 123456789 10 11 123456789 10 11 123456709 10
12 123456789 10 12 123456789 10 12 123456709 10
13 123456789 10 13 123456789 10 13 123456709 10
14 123456789 10 14 123456709 10 14 123456789 10
15 123456789 10 15 123456709 10 15 123456789 10
16 123456789 10 16 123456709 10 16 123456709 10
17 123456789 10 17 123456709 10 17 123456709 10
18 123456789 10 10 123456789 10 10 123456709 10
19 123456789 10 19 123456789 10 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 9 10
20 123456739 10 20 123456709 10 20 123456789 10
21 123456789 10 21 123456789 10 21 123456709 10
22 123456789 10 22 123456709 10 22 123456709 10
23 123456789 10 23 123456709 10 23 123456789 10
24 123456789 10 24 123456709 10 24 123456789 10
25 1 23456789 10 25 123456 7 09 10 25 123456709 10
26 123456789 10 26 123456709 10 26 123456789 10
27 123456789 10 27 123456709 10 27 123456789 10
28 123456789 10 28 123456709 10 28 123456709 10
29 123456789 10 29 123456709 10 29 123456709 10
30 123456789 10 30 123456709 10 30 123456789 10
31 123456789 10 31 123456709 10 31 123456709 10
32 123456789 10 32 123456709 10 32 123456709 10
33 123456789 10 33 123456709 10 33 123456789 10
34 123456709 10 34 123456709 10 34 123456789 10
35 1234 5. 6789 10 35 123456739 10 35 123456709 10
36 123456789 10 36 123456789 10 36 123456709 10
37 123456789 10 37 123456709 10 37 123456709 10
38 123456789 10 38 123456789 10 38 123456709 10
39 123456789 10 39 123456709 10 39 123456709 10
40 123456789 10 40 123456739 10 40 123456709 10
41 12 3 456789 10 41 1 2 3 4 5'6 7 3 9 10 41 123456789 10
42 123456789 10 42 123456789 10 42 123456709 10
43 123456 789 10 43 123456739 10 43 123456789 10
44 123456709 10 44 123456789 10 44 123456709 10
45 123456709 10 45 123456709 10 45 123456709 10
46 123456789 10 46 123456709 10 46 123456739 10
47 123456789 10 47 123456709 10 47 123456739 10
48 123456789 10 48 123456709 10 40 123456709 10
49 123456789 10 49 123456709 10 49 123456789 10
50 123456789 10 50 123456709 10 50 123456789 10
I § s s s
p9 <D ^ <n M ^
* ss; 5- B- B- B- B-
3 1 e o o o o
Ifiiiir
f 2 ? f ^ f ^
Hllll&. F r F ET
mill||r|||
^ y $* K* $* S*
B' 5- §• «• B!' q-
iff l_i
Oii||lil
nil.-
B; 8. - i «
»•
S 5 5 5 5 ^
M c;i ^ «0 •g B
B- B- B- B- B- 1.
^
o o o o o
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
mil *
o
mil
iriririr r
p » p »
*
a i I ! I
104
S < 2 B
' i I*
B-.l i
.
§ 3- i.- * 9
1^ n n
" 5 5 5 3^ 'D T> 'v
5«
5 r
^1 Ol 00 ^
B- B- B- B'
o o o o
5u • ^
"838Q a a « 3 8P c e g c cs- _
cr P ^ d ^ ^ ^
o
e
a, 5 ^ 5 5 5
^
1 i i. iS 9 B B B B
mill
"2, ?
••^ •«i V
g_ ^ JT§ ^ ^S* ?
& 5" a !«
^ ^ 5^ d d g p
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
fe-ffi si's 2.
K ?r. ^ 3 g g ain 2 a> 2
•< 3 M E' tB _
^5»OE,Brig„*
3f f ^i^.^ll
? 5 5 5 ? it if
— w oi •'J «>o
B- B- B- B- B- 3 a;
M ^ M B
o o o o o 9^ o
f* »»*«*«* 3 gi
»* •* ft c s. ?.
s- a" V T T ^
^ ^ ^ ^
5' 3' 3' 3' 3"
9ir K- prw
<^ v<
^ (D ^ P* F*
<< ««; «<
B'
^ B a-<3 o ^pa.- ^ s ^ _
I i ' E 8 t * I
f P.? S. £V ff.s
.1 B g-
§• a. |- ^
'-^ c S 3 2. * d
*!*.*!«! s!
O O O O P
•5 "1 t 1 t
IT »r K* >r w
o
I:
I
if
I
B S I I E 1 a.
S i 1 I i ll
S S S 5 5 If jrM w 01 <D M a
g- g- g- g- g-| J.
o e o o e
Ci ft & ^ ^
« f» «• r» *• Jt* ~-
???5r I
*«J *«J »fj Sk
a. a. S a, a. &
< < < < i
s. a. 2
ta< 6* e;i >4 <0 •e ^
B" B' B' B" B" I b;O O © O O o"
Iflllll
1. 1 8 4? a. 2.
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
o 'i r) 'V
3- P" B" 3* »•U M W M •
O D D D D
S 5 ? 3
y <? s § § s
2 'O o» <-*
2. B- B- B- B' B'
^ 1^ I—i Hi* fc«
«^ o e o o e
fCd
PD » ^ »
^ 1^
*^ *^ *^
a, »! *! *! *l
S* a. S a> a. CL
g g g
s
^ J B- a. B
1. S - 2. y „
1 B- g ? 5
ihil
? ? ? ?
W «;i
B- B' B*
e o o
fff
r*
SS CB 18
« i f
6 6 B
» » »
HI
111^
SSSSSITr I
B-B'B-B'B*« -
S o o e o
nut
I*
5 S 5 S
(O ^ M >^
B- B- B' B- B-
o o o o o
lUnn
c- r r t- r
o> 5 S CL a. o.
e^S SS Si
'.1
111;!}
{\m
T»nd»ncy to DtfT D»oi»ion»
Name .
Next, we have a slightly different set of decisions for you to make.
Instructions ; Sometimes when there is a decision to be made we prefer
to make it ourselves. But on other occasions we prefer to have it
made by someone else or by a group or committee.
On the following pages you are asked to imagine yourself in a
series of situations, and to indicate how you would feel about making
certain decisions. There are no right or wrong answers—the best
answer is the one that indicates how you think you would feel about
making the decisions. We suspect that different people may feel dif-
ferently, and that people who prefer to decide for themselves in- one
situation may feel quite differently in another situation.
After each situation has been described you will find a seven-step
scale that looks like this:
Definitely Definitely
prefer to prefer
decide someone else
myself : : : • *• • decide
Please put a checkmark in a space on the scale to indicate how you
would feel about the situation that has been described. If you feel
very sure that you would prefer to make the decision yourself,
or that
you would prefer to have someone else make it, you should put Y^ur
chedOTark in one of the end spaces. If you are very unsure, you
should
chedTSe m?ddle space. If ySu aren't sure but are leaning one way or
the other, you should check one of the in-between spaces.
You are a floor counselor for a group of 35 students living
in a
dormitory. Two roommates come to you and say they don't want
to live
toSSther Anymore, but each wants to remain in the room. They
want you
to decide which one will move. You know which one you would
like to
have move. WUl you decide, or will you tell the students they must
decide for themselves?
Definitely
decide
^*Hh«
myself » • ; ; ; : decide
You are an administrator in a small college. Reduced
financial
support makes it necessary to discharge one faculty "^^f^;. .
soSel Committee has narrowed the field down to two candidates,
but has
fche final decision to you. You can either pick the person who
Hit be d^tcharged, or ask the Committee to make that decision. Which
will you do?
Definitely S^^^^li^^^^
ask Committee decide
to decide :. : : : • • "^Y^^^^
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Your daughter is getting married. She has 7 very close friends.
Only 6 can participate in the wedding. She asks you to help her choose
which one vdll be left out. You don't really care much for one of her
close friends, and your daughter knows this. Will you decide which
one is to be left out, or will you tell your daughter she will have to
decidet
Definitely Definitely
decide tell her to
myself decide
You are a guidance counselor at a high school. A student you have
counseled was arrested for assaulting someone inside the school build-
ing, and has served some time in the local juvenile detention center.
On the recommendation of the probation officer he has now been releasedf
and a decision must be made as to whether or not he shall be permitted
to return to school. Will you make the decision or ask the probation
officer to make it?
Definitely ask Definitely
probation decide
officer to decide : : : : : : myself
You have gone shopping for furniture. Your spouse was supposed
to meet you, but something came up. There are two couches on sale
that appeal to you, but you aren't sure which your spouse would pre-
fer. If you wait until the next day one or both of them may be sold.
Will you decide, or will you take a chance that your spouse can get
down town tomorrow and decide?
Definitely Definitely
decide let spouse
myself : : : : J« J decide
You are a teacher in a high school. Two students have applied
to be foreign exchange students the following year, but only one can
be accepted. You have the responsibility for making the final deci-
sion, but are only moderately well acquainted with the two students.
Will you make the decision, or ask other teachers to make it?
Definitely ask Definitely
others to decide
decide ; : : : i ? myself
You are an M.D. whose patient has an unusual, but not very seri-
ous, malady. There are two known treatments for the problem, and each
establishes a lifelong allergy which prevents the subsequent use of
the other. Medical records indicate that each has about a 90% chance
of curing the problem. Will you decide for yourself which of the two
treatments to use, or will you ask a board of consultants to decide?
Definitely Definitely
decide consultants to
myself : : : - • decide
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You are a student in a human relations course. One of the course
requirements Involves pairing off with one other member of the class
for several meetings in which you will be required to discuss your per-
sonal problems. You are scheduled to be paired with either of two other
personSf one of whom seems to have a terrible personality and the other
of whom seems to have a rather unattractive personality. You can either
choose one of the two as your discussion partner, or let the teacher
choose one. Which will you do?
Definitely Definitely
let teacher decide
decide : : : : : : myself
You are the Assistant Scout Leader, and have been instructed not
to raaJce any major policy decisions without first consulting the Section
Chief. While on a camping trip with a group of Scouts you are contact-*
ed by a newspaper reporter who wants to do a pictorial story of the
camping experience. You suspect that the Section Chief would not ob-
ject, but aren't sure. Will you make the decision, or insist that he
drive back to town and ask the Section Chief?
Definitely Definitely
decide let Section Chief
myself ; : : : : : decide
You are a marine biologist who has developed a new breed of fish
that grows very rapidly and is likely to multiply more rapidly than
any other species. As a source of meat it might prove a boon for man-
kind, but there is also a danger that it might upset the ecology and
cause almost all other marine life to perish. You have located a land-
locked pond where, In 10 years, you can determine whether it is a boon
or a curse, and only a few immediate neighbors can possibly be harmed
by your experiment. Will you decide for yourself whether to proceed
with the test, or ask a board of marine specialists to decide for you?
Definitely Definitely
ask others decide
to decide : : : : : ' myself
Self Appraisal Questionnaire
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You have completed the first part of the experiment, and now we
would like to gather some "background" information. Please answer the
following questions:
Name Age Sex
M_F Class
Campus address_ — P^°"®
Religious preference: Catholic ^Protestant ^Jewish ^Other
Major department at U-Mass Grade point average_
None
Do you remember what your College Board Scores were?
Verbal.
Do you participate in athletic activities? If so,
what?_
What are your extracurricular activities?.
Math
How well would you say you are doing in college?
(please rate yourself
on the following scales)
1 2 3 4
S
extremely well P°°^
Are you pleased with your social life?
extremely pleased
^ quite dispieasea
Do you find that you are interested in school and
other i^P^J^";^^^^;^?
vities in your present life, or are you generally
bored or disinterested^
2 _3 4 5
extremely interested
^ored
Are you doing what you really want to do with
your life at the present
time?
- 2 3 L 5
^ ^4 ti.^^.,
" not at alldefinitely
xr:.T.*~^."?
treem fatigue, etc.)? Ves No
Have you ever, or do you now contemplate,
seeking guidance or psycho-
logical help here at U-Mass? Yes No
Next, we would like to ask y-/?::o?hlli'c°arsi:iatfons? "p^easf"t?y'
?r^^tf%fcS^atr:Ad^h-eft fs XSret"nd1U.er that your
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S»lf ApTa:ai»al of D«ci«iv«M8«
answers are strictly confidential * and will be used only for statistical
purposes.
Each of the following questions can be answered by circling the appro-
priate number on the 7-point scale which follows each question. Simply
note on the scale how true you feel this statement is as a description
of you.
1. I feel it is easy for me to make most decisions.
1 2 3 ±. 5 6 7
not tru^'at all somewhat true very true
2. I often get anxious when I have to make decisions.
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
not true at all somewhat true very true
3. It takes me a very long time to reach a decision.
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
not true at all
' somewhat true very true
4. After I reach a decision, I'm never sure it was the right one.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not true at all
' somewhat true ^ very true
5. Small decisions (such as what clothes to wear, what brand of cereal
to buy, what movie to see) are more difficult for me than really big
ones*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not true at all somewhat true very true
6. Big decisions are more difficult for me than small ones.
i 2 3 4 5 6 7
not true at all somewhat true ^ very true
7. Compared to most of my friends, I am a very decisive person.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
noi fc
'
rue a^ all
'
somewhat true ' very true
Please describe some of the decisions which you find most difficult and
most eag:^.^^
difficult decisions. Most Easy decision?
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Self Appraisal Questionnaire - Part 2,
Instructions ; Please answer the following questions, trying to be
as honest to your true feelings as possible. All responses are strictly
confidential.
1. Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days
—would you say you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these
days?
Very happy Pretty happy Not too happy
2. In general, how satisfying do you find the way you are spending your
life these days? Would you call it completely satisfying, pretty satis-
fying, or not very satisfying?
Completely Pretty satisfying Not very satisfying
The following questions are more specific
—
you should check in the appro
prlate space whether the statement is almost always true of you, often
true , sometimes true , seldom true , or never true , (at. ot. stt. sdt, nt)
at ot stt sdt nt
3. I generally feel in pretty good spirits.
4. I am very satisfied with life.
5* I find a good deal of happiness in life.
6. I feel that I am a person of worth, at
least on an equal plane with others.
7. I feel that I have a number of good
qualities.
8. I am able to do things as well as most
other people.
9. I feel I do not have too much to be proud
of.
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
!!• Sometimes I think I am no good at all.
12. I am a useful guy to have around.
13. I feel that I can't do anything right.
14. When I do a job, I do it well.
15. I feel that my life is not very useful.
16. I feel that nobody wants me.
17. I feel lonesome.
18. These days my parents really help out;
they don't let me down.
19. I feel loved.
20. No one cares what happens, when you get
right down to it.
21. The life of the average man is getting
worse, not better.
22. People don't really care what happens to
the next fellow.
23. I get the feeling that life is not very
useful
•
24. These days I get the feeling that I'm just
not a part of things.
25. These days I don't know who I can depend
on.
S&tiB-
faetloi
in Life
Self-
Esteem
Lack oi
Social
social
Support
Anonie
(almost always true » at; often true - ot; sometimes true stt; seldom
true sdt; never true « nt)
at ot stt sdt nt
26. It is hardly fair to bring a child into
the world the way things look now. _^ >
27. I feel no one really cares much about j Anoale
what happens to me. ...^ i
28. I feel the future looks bright. _
29. Things seem hopeless.
30. I feel bored. «^ . _
31. I feel down in the dumps. > ^VreBuio
32. I feel depressed.
33. I am bothered by noise.
34. I feel like smiling. ^
35. I feel happy. / Sadness
36. I feel sad. _ ^» _
37. Although I don't show it, I am very
jealous.
38. I am likely to hold a grudge.
39. When I look back on what's happened to me,
I feel cheated. »
40. I don't seem to get what's coming to
me. ..1.^ —— —^ —— \ ResentBen
41. I feel I get a raw deal out of life.
42. If I let people see the way I fell, they
would think I was hard to get along
with —
43. Other people always seem to get the
breaks. — «
Finally, we would like to ask you a few true-false type questions.
True False
OteMsivaness
1. I have very few fears compared to my friends.
2. I have no dread of going into a room by myself
where other people have already gathered and
are talking.
3. I have no fear of water.
.4. I am inclined to take things hard.
5. When I am feeling very happy and active, some-
one who is blue or low will spoil it all.
6. My plans have frequently seemed so full of
difficulties that I have had to give them all
7. When I am in a group of people I have trouble
thinking of the right things to talk about.
8. I believe I am no more nervous than others.
9. I should like to belong to several clubs or
lodges.
10. At times I feel that I can make up my mind
with unusually great ease.
11. I have had no difficulty in keeping ray balance
walking.
1
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True False
12. I am not likely to speak to people until they speak
to me.
13. My hands have not become clumsy or awkward. _«
14. I love to go to dances.
15. I strongly defend my own opinions as a rule. •
16. I blush no more often than others.
17. I am not bothered by a great deal of belching of
gas from my stomach. -i..—
18. I enjoy detective or mystery stories.
You have now completed the part of this study which is done here in the
"laboratory." There are two additi onal parts of this study, one in-
volving two friends of yours who you believe would be willing to fill
out a very short questionnaire for us, the other involving a short ques-
tionnaire which will be mailed to you in a few weeks, which you may com-
plete at your leisure and return via campus mail. Some of you will be
contacted and asked to return for a short interview, and will earn extra
course credit for this. The reason for the part involving friends of
yours is that we need information about you which doesn't come from you,
but which a friend can accurately give us. In other words, this is sort
of an "objective" technique to see if your self-perceptions agree with
how yovir friends see you. Thus, it is important not to inform your
friend of the questionnaire or your answers to some of the questions.
Also, we will need to inform your friend that you have given permission
for him to give us some information about you. So, on the next page,
you will see two copies of this form, along with a space for you to give
your permission. We ask you to enter the name and address of a friend
on the top of each form, and to sign your name giving permission. Please
turn the page and look at these forms.
XJ.H
Dear
Anxiety on Exams (I-5)
Kknal Self-appraisal Questionnaire Self Appraisal of
Performance (6-12)
During the past two months you have participated in a research
study of decision-making and how it relates to other behavior. VJe now
ask you to complete this final, short questionnaire, which relates toyour present feelings. When we receive this questionnaire from you, you
will be awarded your course credits for participation in this experiment.You can return this form to me in one of two ways. Either drop it off at
my office (501 Tobin)
, or return it through Campus Mail (no stampe nec-
essary). To send it through Campus Mail, you need simply FOLD this
questionnaire so that the label with my address is showing (this will
conceal your address), staple or tape it closed, and drop it in any
CAMPUS mail box. If you would like me to send you the results of this
study, you may so indicate at the end of this questionnaire. Thank you
very much for your help and your contribution to this research.
With the approach of final examinations, many students find that they
have strong feelings related to their performance, studying, etc. The
following questions relate to your feelings as you approach finals.
1. How much time do you spend worrying or thinking about your finals
during the week of final examinations?
Most or all of the time
A good deal of the time
Occasionally
Just a little
Not at all
2. How much anxiety or fear do you feel when you think about finals?
Try to think about finals right now . « . how much fear or anxiety
do you feel?
_________
Extremely intense anxiety or fear
Fairly intense anxiety or fear
Moderate anxiety or fear
Only slight anxiety or fear
No anxiety or fear.
3. Please describe your anxiety or fear as you are about to begin an
examination. Imagine yourself in the room, pencil in hand, final
exam face down on the desk, the teacher says "BEGIN." Your anxiety
or fear is:
Extremely intense
Fairly intense
Moderately intense
Only slight fear or anxiety
No fear or anxiety at all
4. How concerned or worried are you about your performance on finals?
' Extremely worried
Somewhat worried
Concerned, but not worried
Not very concerned or interested
Not at all interested
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5. Describe your reaction when you find that you have failed or done
poorly on an examination.
I feel as if I have failed as a person; I feel inadequate
"ZZZZ ^ ^ troubled, but I am able to get over it fairly easily
It troubles me a little
It hardly bothers me at all
^ laugh it off, for tests don't matter anyway
6. How well do you expect to do on finals this semester?
Excellently
Very well
________
Average
POor
Fail
7. How well would you like to do this semester?
_______
Excellently
_______
Very well
_______
Average
Poor
ZZZI ^ail
8. How well satisfied are you with your college experience this
semester?
Extremely satisfied
_____
Very satisfied
.
Neutral
Somewhat dissatisfied
.
Very dissatisfied
9. Has school met your needs and expectations this semester?
Completely
Partially
,
well as can be expected '
Not very well
Not at all
10 Have you undergone any significant "changes" this semester,
either
goid or bad? ihese\ight include experiences, changes in values or be-
liefs, changes in life style and habits, extreme moods, sought
psychological help, etc.?
I have undergone a great many changes, mostly good
~~
I have experienced some changes, mostly good
I have experienced no changes, good or bad
I have experienced some changes, mostly for the Daa.
I have undergone a lot of changes, all for the bad
Please describe some of these changes, if any_
11. Do you see yourself as progressing in school and in
life as you
plan and desire?
^ ^ - t ..•,4. ^-K^m
^ Definitely, things are going just as I want them to.
"~~ Things are generally going as I want thiln to.
.
Neutral
^ i.w i.^
Things are not really going just as I want them to.
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12, Finally» please describe, in your own words, how you see your ability
to make decisions (are you a good decision maker? why? how? etc.),
and then how you believe your ability to make decisions (tMr. lack of
ability) helps, hurts, or otherwise affects your life. Also, please
mention how you feel you became the kind of decision-maker you now
are (parents, school, personal experiences, etc.).
Again, thank you very much for your help in this research.
Michael S. Weissman
Department of Psychology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
Pttor Rating of D*ciftlv«n«Bs (l-7)
Ptter Rating of Psrforaanc* (8-12)
Peer-rating. Questionnaire
To:
Your name was given to us by « who is par-
ticipating in a psychology study on decision-making. We are trying to
learn as much as possible about how people make decisions, and how this
relates to their other behavior at college. As you can see in the next
paragraph, your friend has given us permission to send this questionnaire
to you. Your friend will NOT see your responses, and all information
will be strictly confidential. The idea is that we need some objective
information about our subjects from the point of view of other people
who know them. Here is your friend's permission to give us this infor-
mation. J T w
I am a participating in this study of decision-making, and I here-
by give my permission for you to answer the questions in this question-
naire, which I have seen. Thank you.
Now, we would like you to answer the following questions by checking
the appropriate number on the 7-point scale which follows each question.
That is, if you think the statement is "not true at all" of your friend,
then you would circle number 1, if it is just a little true, circle number
2, etc., up to number 7, which means it is always true. Don't forget,
you are to estimate how true this statement is of your friend, and he or
she will NOT see your answers.
1. I feel that it is easy for my friend to make most decisions.
1 2 3 4 5 6
not true at all somewhat true . very true
2. My friend often gets anxious when she/he has to make decisions.
1 2 3 ±^ 5 6^ 7
not true at all somewhat true very true
3. It takes my friend a very long time to reach a decision.
1 2 3 4 5 6 2
not true at all somewhat true " very true
4. After my friend reaches a cecision, she/he is never sure it was the
right one.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not true at all somewhat true very true
5. Small decisions (such as what clothes to wear, what brand of cereal
to buy, which movie to see) are more difficult for my friend than really
big ones.
6 7
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5. Big decisions are mors difficult for my friend than small ones.
1 2 3_ 4 5 6 7
not true at all somewhat true
.
very true
7. Compared to most of my friends, this friend is a very decisive person,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
not true at all somewhat true very true
Finally, we would like to ask you a few general questions about your
friend,
8. How well would you say your friend is doing in college?
1 2_ 3 ^4 5
extremely well very poorly
9. How would you rate your friend's social life?
1 2 3 4. 5
excellent very poor
10 « How well do you think your friend will do in life?
1 2 3 4 L-
extremely well very poorly
11. How would you say your friend reacts to stress or problems?
1 2 3 4 5
extremely well very poorly
12. Would you say that your friend is interested in school and other
activities in his present life, or would you say that she/he is gener-
ally bored or disinterested?
extremely well very poorly
After you complete this questionnaire, please mail it to me by simply
FOLDING it up so that the little label with my address on it is showing,
staple or tape it closed, and drop it in any CAMPUS mail box. If you
live off campus, a stamp is already attached, so drop it into any regular
mail boxo Note that by folding it this way, you conceal your name and
address, and leave mine showing. It is important to do this properly,
of course. .
Thank you very much for your help in this research. If you are interest-
ed in obtaining the results of this research, either note that on the bot-
tom of this form, or write to me during the Spring. I will be very happy
to send you a summary of all our findings. Again, thank you.
Michael Weissman
Department of Psychology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
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W-Titten Feedback to Subiectd
I wou^'h^i ^^.r"
^^^^ completed your participation in this experimentuld like to personally thank you, and exolain in a n t I^S^f S Z
,
exactly what the purpose this Sp^rSJenHslSd'hoS the"ttr"l?'bf
'
,nH J*'S,'''^f° purpose Of this experiment is straightforward
?S?lv tM=
"ably already aware of what we are looking fol. EwStl
it:^' t^i ^^.^ °^ decision-makings we are trying to learn
d^c?!iS^!;i!^v^' *5:fjr^°"= "P«='^ °^ dlcision-making, Ind (2?"Sw ?See ision-making ability of individuals relates to their abilitv towith stress and adjust to the normal pressures of liSr It is mv cSS''
^!e'?S ^nSL^"?i^J^*^" f? ^fcisive. thit is, thise who'a^I I^Sllydecision-maicing process
, will cope better with
JecL^ iidfcftn^^'S?- *=°P^"? behavior is indicated by l^e S-joctlve n i a ors of performance (academic performance, social inter-
(set?-lit:™^'a?fei:?l""'*/^^^' ^^^""^ "pS;oral=i?y m«^res"^ if-este«n, ali nation, tendency to depression, etc.).
vnn. ttl li^'^l l' f^Y!^*} measures of decisiveness were obtained from
ina ^f?^
(deciding the ratio of squares to circles by look-
mn^H 4 t ^^P^® number) was aimed at learning how
?nsSriSfnfS^«iv"H^'''' decision. The Sxt two
d2rir?2n«^«
to give us information about your tendency to defer
h!^?!^^®
to others and how much risk you are willing to tolerate in a
^oni iiJ*^ . ?' ^® f?'^®^ direct questions aboit how you evaluate
««nt
decision-making ability. Taken together, these instruments pre-
were o2ta?nL^ SnJ!''^^?^
your decision-making style. After these measures
r«nfn« nfi?,!?' questionnaires related to thecopi g behavior mentioned above, and at the end of the semester, you com-pleted an anxiety questionnaire related to final examinations , ind some ofyou were interviewed. Also, we received some information from two friends
LY?^^^L 9ave us. These data give us a picture of yourability to cope with daily life and its stresses.
P^ x:u r
Our job, of course, is to make sense of all this data. We are look-ing for two things in this data: (1) whether the various measures of de-
^o2i^?!!SS2 "^fJ^i?*^®"* ^^^^ ^aSh other, and (2) how each of the measurescorrelated with the measures of psychological adjustment and coping. In
t.WHir?4-*^f®®' "^f
hope to learn more about the nature of decisiveness—
^^t,t^t ^f.^ ^i"^^® ^""^^^ several aspects, or whether each of the
L^"""^!:
f"®"^ must be seen as an independent phenomenon, for example.
nor^int ^f?^^?'' T it^^^.^^ ^^^^^ aspects Of decisiveness is most im-p ta , relative to the others. In the second case, we want to see if
^^ir^^^I ^^x.? <=^aracteristic of individuals, accounts for some of
Hofi^ °^ adjustment and coping shown by these indivi-
vidifL Snfwffv,''???^' rf"^ ^®*^" decisive helps indi-uais cope ith life and its stresses.
cannot supply you with your individual scores on the
w^wMn^^o^^«Aw^S''^''^^^^ validity of the measures is one of the things
nnmi^!2 ^
out and any single score is misleading and subject to a
fri^H 2 u^''®*'®^^''"^- however, any subject in this experiment whowould like to have a summary of the overall findings of this study mayhave one by either leaving your name with me now (I will mall the sura-
(501 TobinT?"
^^^^ semester) or by stopping by my office next semester
^^^^^ y°^^ participation in this study,
and for contributing to my exploration of decisiveness.
Michael S. Welssman

